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Abstract 
 
Discourses on network neutrality have often, if not always, 
been introduced without any more in-depth evaluation of 
their normative bearings. This article pursues such an 
evaluative approach against a specific empirical backdrop. 
It inquires into that which has been the archetypal voice in 
network neutrality discourses: Google‘s. In doing so, the 
article reveals as much about Google‘s views on network 
neutrality as it does about the normative context and 
regulatory implications of Google‘s own activities. 
Drawing on policy propositions formally put forward by 
Google, the article demonstrates that Google‘s support for 
network neutrality relates to a broader normative culture 
that Google‘s propositions advance. Such is a culture in 
which Google‘s possibilities of reasoning and acting upon 
its reasons assume a degree of priority in relation to those 
of other actors in the information environment. The article 
demonstrates that the method of such a culture is the 
nullification, neutralization of equal possibilities of 
reasoning and action by other actors but Google. It explains 
the incoherence of Google‘s overall approach and refutes 
the idea that other actors – here ISPs – should be treated 
more detrimentally than Google due to their being an 
Internet bottleneck in a way that Google arguably is not. 
Discussing the normative contours of Google‘s influence, 
the article points at the limitations of existing theories about 
the regulation of ―search‖ and suggests an alternative 
theoretical model that focuses on search from a broader 
perspective within the regulation of the information 
environment. In the model proposed, neutrality does not 
play any role – reason and alterity do. 
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FOREWORDS 
 
This article is part of what began as a research project on the 
normative boundaries of network neutrality – the widely 
held idea that Internet service providers must not 
discriminate packets of bits on the Internet according to their 
source, content or destination. Early results were presented 
in a congress organized by the Hans Bredow Institute for 
Media Research, at the University of Hamburg, under the 
title ―A Network of Values‖. As the research further 
unfolded, however, it rested evident that network neutrality‘s 
normative context and politico-regulatory implications 
ensuing from it were deeply intertwined with those of 
network neutrality‘s most prominent patron – Google – to 
the point that the former could not be understood without the 
latter being as well. While there is much already said on 
network neutrality, Google‘s own normative universe in this 
regard has been left somewhat untouched. As the article will 
show, inquiring into Google‘s formal stances on network 
neutrality raises important questions on the regulation of 
Google‘s own activities, on the idea of neutrality itself, what 
it means for politics, the state and agency in general, and on 
the type of political system we may wish to live within in 
the information age. The article answers these questions, 
laying out some assertive conclusions about Google‘s 
stances already at the outset. These conclusions are 
deepened as the article unfolds. 
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Timeo hominem unius libri 
-- Aquinas 
I. SEARCH AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
‗The King can do no wrong‘ – goes the proverbial saying 
whose contemporary equivalent can be found in the idea 
that ‗Google does no evil‘.1 Both expressions convey, in 
their different ways and with regard to their different times, 
a description of a state of affairs and a normative directive 
ensuing from such a state. Descriptively, they reflect 
historical or contemporary beliefs in the righteousness of a 
sovereign. Normatively, they entail that the acts of such a 
sovereign ought to be judged by standards different from 
those under which the acts of ordinary people ought to be. 
If there is one forced element in such an analogy, that may 
be only that the first, ancient expression, even in legal 
systems where crown privileges have held strong 
throughout the centuries, has been widely attenuated by the 
historical developments of public law.
2
 The authority of the 
                                                 
1. ―Don't Be Evil‖ was a motto officially adopted by Google 
during an internal corporate meeting in 2001. According to accounts by 
Google's own personnel, it was chosen, together with other general 
principles, to reflect ―what Google was all about‖; it was adopted 
within an efficiency-oriented ethos, by engineers resistant to the 
excessive specificity of rules. See JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW 
GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES OF BUSINESS AND 
TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 138 (2006). 
2.  Think of the United Kingdom. From the Magna Carta, in 
1215, to date, in cases like M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377, the 
history of British constitutional law, though its mishaps and setbacks, 
has been one of control and subjection of the Crown. See, e.g., JAMES 
C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 29 (1992), quoted in ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC 
LAW 40 (2003) (arguing that the Magna Carta was itself ―based on a 
political theory of 'monarchical responsibility...'‖). This, of course, is 
far from claiming that there is anything resembling a regime of perfect 
tripartite separation of powers in Britain, with the Crown entirely at 
check by the judicial power. See, e.g., Adam Tomkins, id., at 54-60. 
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second, contemporary motto, however, has been asserting 
itself ever more strongly. 
When we speak of Google's position of sovereignty 
one can read such a claim as framed in figurative, 
metaphorical terms. Other works have advanced similar 
claims with more market-oriented tints. In his book The 
Googlization of Everything, Siva Vaidhyanathan notes, with 
fitting irony, that ―we are not Google's customers: we are its 
product‖3 – our time, our attention, our preferences, our 
personal attributes thus, these are the offerings on which 
Google builds its revenue. In this sense, we are not the 
persons who buy, we are the things that are sold. 
Vaidhyanathan's position cannot indeed be understood but 
in a metaphorical context. Lessened though our dignity may 
be through these commodifying bonds that link us to 
Google, our status as persons (and thus not products) still 
obtains. 
And yet, we do contract out portions of our liberty; 
we transfer these to an overarching organization that 
purposes (or purports) to reflect the wider public interest – 
the ―database of intentions‖,4 in John Battelle's words – and 
to do so in a benevolent or at least non-malicious way. We 
become increasingly dependent on such an organization, at 
a very fundamental level, to navigate what Charles Taylor 
has suitably called the ―space of questions‖5 – the 
                                                 
3. SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING : 
(AND WHY WE SHOULD WORRY) 3 (2011). 
4. BATTELLE, supra note 1, at 1. 
5. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF 
MODERN IDENTITY 29 (1991) (―[T]o speak of orientation is to 
presuppose a space-analogue within which one finds one's way. To 
understand our predicament in terms of finding or losing orientation in 
moral space is to take the space which our frameworks seek to define as 
ontologically basic. The issue is, through what framework-definition 
can I find my bearings in it? In other words, we take as basic that the 
human agent exists in a space of questions. And these are the questions 
to which our framework-definitions are answers, providing the horizon 
within which we know where we stand, and what meanings things have 
for us‖). 
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ontologically basic framework-definition within which we 
find our ways and moral bearings in the world. The illusion 
that just to wish such a framework away and switch to a 
different provider is costless will be further addressed 
below – though it is, as I say, an illusion. Google is the 
sovereign, not only in metaphorical but in very real and 
unprecedentedly fundamental terms. It gives, it takes away 
the reasons whose number, variety and relevance are 
increasingly determinant of the ways we author our lives – 
of our personal autonomy, hence. This will be ever more so 
in a society whose normative orientations come to be 
increasingly and explicitly articulated in the institutional 
orders of the information environment. Our liberty thus 
hinges upon the configurations of that framework and of an 
information environment which is remarkably influenced 
by it.
6
 We are not Google's product: we are its subjects. 
Now, whether or not one accepts as a fact this bold 
attribution of sovereignty to an Internet company, one may 
still accept the more modest remainder of the propositions 
introduced at the outset – that Google's motto reflects: i) a 
belief in its (moral or cognitive) evaluative superiority – 
which gains strength when one notices that Google's self-
assigned mission is that of ―organizing all the world's 
information‖ and that this entails some degree of self-
confidence in so doing; and ii) an expectation that, due to 
its claimed superiority, the company should be judged by 
                                                 
6. Recent studies show that 6% of all global Internet traffic 
comes from Google (a number that may, depending on the variables, go 
up to 12%). See Craig Labovitz, Google Sets New Internet Traffic 
Record, ARBOR NETWORKS (Oct. 25, 2010, 11:03 AM), 
http://goo.gl/hBTg9.  This makes Google the largest source of traffic on 
the Internet. And yet, it is a measurement of traffic itself – not of 
Google's influence. Compared to Skype's, for instance, much of 
Google's type of traffic may be relatively light. 6%, thus, is a very 
impressive number. But the real, unanswered question, is how much of 
the remaining traffic, though not carried by Google, arises directly or 
indirectly from information obtained through it.  
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standards different from those by which ordinary people – 
or companies – should be. 
Both these self-aggrandizing ascriptions come 
together in the main argument put forward in this article. In 
the pages that follow I will demonstrate, in the light of a 
concrete example, that Google seeks to establish an 
evaluative culture in which its possibilities of reasoning and 
acting upon its reasons assume a degree of priority with 
regard to those of other agents in the information 
environment. The pursuit of such a priority by Google, I 
will argue, presents itself as a call for the nullification, 
neutralization of equal possibilities of reasoning and action 
by other agents.
7
 Having examined this argument and 
understood the problems it poses, we then discuss which, 
amongst different conceptions of the political system, is the 
most suitable for dealing with such problems. Inquiring into 
all this, I believe, has immense relevance in a moment in 
which competition authorities, in Europe
8
 and in the US 
alike,
9 
seek to evaluate the regulatory implications of 
Google's practices in the realm of search. The conclusions 
reached in this article, however, also point to the limitations 
of a competition-based approach that focuses on search 
engines as particular ontological entities
10
 and on search as 
a relevant market. 
                                                 
7. It is in this technical sense, which will get clear more ahead, 
that the word neutralization will be used in this article. 
8. Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission 
probes allegations of antitrust violations by Google (Nov. 30, 2010), 
available at http://goo.gl/FrzcS. 
9. Editorial, Investigating Google, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 05, 2011, at 
A20, available at http://goo.gl/CAV8K. 
10. A number of earlier works seem to adopt this ontological 
approach with regard to search. See, e.g., Helen Nissenbaum & Lucas 
Introna, Shapping the Web: Why the Politics of Search Engines 
Matters, 16(3) THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 169 (2000) (for a pioneer, 
normative account discussing how the ways search engines function are 
―at odds with the … ideology of the Internet as a public good‖ (id. at 
178)). See also Oren Bracha & Frank Accountability in the Law of 
Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008); and James Grimmelmann, 
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The article runs like this: The following section will 
focus on a very prominent instance in which the pursuit of 
neutralization of otherness, of alterity by Google presented 
itself to the fullest – the case of a call for the neutrality of 
Internet service providers (ISPs), also known as 'network 
neutrality' or, in other words, the idea that ISPs must not 
discriminate packets of data on the Internet based on their 
source, content or destination.
11
 
Until it ―changed‖ its position in August 2010,12 
Google had been one of the most vocal proponents of 
                                                                                                 
The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2007). 
Pasquale has recently expanded this perspective in a cogent piece. See 
Franq Pasquale, Dominant Search Engines: An Essential Cultural & 
Political Facility, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE 
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 401 (Berin Szoka and Adam Marcus eds., 
2010), Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness and 
inviting ―scholars and activists to move beyond the crabbed vocabulary 
of competition law to develop a richer normative critique of search 
engine dominance‖ (id. at 402). 
11. I will not pursue here any comprehensive account of what 
network neutrality means in all its different flavours – if only because 
these so are varied and manifold that they make of network neutrality, 
to use Christopher Yoo's words, ―a naked normative commitment‖. 
Christopher Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19:1 HARVARD  J.L. &  
TECH. 1, 26 (2005). I will, however, describe and evaluate that which I 
trust to be the archetypal stance on network neutrality; the stance most 
faithful to net neutrality's teleological foundations: Google's. Network 
neutrality here is mostly interesting for the world view it at the same 
times draws on and brings about. 
12. Google is widely believed to have shifted its stance on 
network neutrality in a joint proposal with Verizon Communications 
Inc., sent to the US Federal Communications Commission in August 
2010. See Alan Davidson & Tom  Tauke, A Joint Policy Proposal for 
an Open Internet, GOOGLE PUBLIC POLICY BLOG (Aug. 09, 2010, 01:38 
PM ET), http://goo.gl/voeVZ [hereinafter Joint Proposal]. The 
proposal, in a nutshell, suggests a differentiated approach for providers 
of wireless and wireline Internet access – with a significant set of 
constraints applying to the latter but not to the former. The idea seems 
to be this: on the one hand, traditional broadband ISPs will be subject to 
neutralizing constraints that enable Google to ride freely upon them. On 
the other hand, the approach to wireless communications will be one 
that enables Google to be a first mover and, in partnership with 
9   
 
 
 
network neutrality. Its shift had less to do with normative 
repentance than with a pragmatic recognition of the 
regulatory difficulties in the implementation of its 
propositions – coupled, of course, with some degree of self-
interestedness in the pursuit of alternative paths. In essence, 
however, Google continued to push a similar agenda of 
restraint for ISPs under a different terminology. We will 
discuss the almost incredible, indeed absolute form of 
restraint reflected in Google's formal calls for network 
neutrality and compare it with the position finally adopted 
by the Federal Communications Commission on the matter. 
I will highlight the incoherences of both these approaches – 
Google's more so than FCC's – and of the conceptions of 
law and action that they espouse. 
Both FCC's and Google's approaches rely in part on 
the idea that search engines in particular and application 
and service providers in general should be judged by 
standards different from those applicable to ISPs. Part III 
addresses this misconception explaining how it amounts to 
an exclusion of ISPs from the normative whole that we call 
―the Internet‖ and relies on the false assumption that 
application and service providers cannot control the infra-
structure of the information environment as ISPs are 
claimed to do. The article focuses, in particular, on the case 
of search and on the argument that customers are always 
free to switch away from Google's services. 
Part IV revisits the overall claims of the article 
under the lights of contemporary liberal theory. It submits 
that, rather than providing support for the neutralization of 
any actor in the information environment, or overall 
requiring that stakeholders – ISPs, states, inter alia – keep 
away from people's evaluative pursuits on the Internet, 
                                                                                                 
Verizon, build upon its established dominance in the information 
environment. Doing so, Google can, in practice, neutralize other ISPs in 
ways it knows it would not be able to do through policy intervention by 
the FCC. Network neutrality, however, was overall abandoned by 
Google as a term of art. Below we understand why. 
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liberalism actually requires that a range of substantive 
choices are made by stakeholders precisely to enable people 
to live autonomous lives. Here the article engages with the 
most ambitious attempt so far to devise a political theory 
for the information environment, Yochai Benkler's. 
Benkler's thoughts lend remarkable – if contestable – 
authority to Google's world views and aspirations. But they 
also silently (and unfortunately) depart from the sounder 
political theory of Joseph Raz, which Benkler claims to 
embrace while only selectively doing so. The article draws 
on Raz's liberal perfectionist framework to propose a model 
for state action that moves us beyond neutrality and beyond 
overly optimistic accounts of self-regulatory possibilities of 
the information environment, in any of its layers. Part V 
concludes. 
 
II. NEUTRALIZING ALTERITY 
 
There have been many instances – and one may argue this 
has happened systematically – in which Google sought to 
establish a framework of absolute social priority for its own 
reasons. At times this happened in defiance, in attempted 
exclusion of the dominant, exclusionary reasons of the law. 
That was the case, for example, when Google undertook to 
digitize all books in existence on earth (were these in the 
public domain or not) without seeking permission from 
their respective rights' holders.
13
 Or when Google decided 
to challenge a legal regime with which it had been until 
then cooperating: that of China – in a process that continues 
to unfold. Indeed, having moved its search engine away 
                                                 
13. Having been challenged through a Class Action, Google 
pursued a settlement that, for the time being, has been struck by the 
Judge hearing the case. See, inter alia, Pamela Samuelson & David 
Nimmer, The Amended Google Book Settlement: Judge Chin’s 
Decision, WIPO MAGAZINE (Jun. 2011), available at 
http://goo.gl/1mvu9. 
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from the Mainland,
14
 Google now champions the use of the 
international trade system to nullify China's possibilities of 
choosing reasons which it trusts to be of worthy pursuit in 
the information environment.
15
 
If effective, all those processes of prioritization of 
Google's own reasons – for reasons which I will enlarge on 
below – would threaten the prospects of contemporary 
liberalism. In short, those processes would impair the 
possibility that other actors but Google act upon reasons 
chosen by them. The liberal logic would be thus inverted 
but to a company that expects to be judged as doing no evil 
and, paradoxically, as being a champion of values of liberal 
nature.  
Nowhere does this problem appear more clearly and 
explicitly articulated than in the debates concerning the 
idea of network neutrality. The attempts to neutralize 
China's possibilities of regulating 'the Internet' and to 
establish exceptions for copyright in the Google Books case 
also challenge liberalism.
16
 But they do so mainly by 
challenging the authority of the state and the law – and thus 
the possibility that these intervene to preserve, in the 
                                                 
14. David Drummond, A New Approach to China, THE OFFICIAL 
GOOGLE BLOG (Dec. 01, 2010, 03:00 PM), http://goo.gl/SqpSk. 
15. One of the main arguments used in recent World Trade 
Organization proceedings against China is precisely the idea of 
'technological neutrality', which enjoins political authorities not to 
reflect specific choices in society's technological infrastructure. I have 
dealt with the merits of China's choices in this context in an earlier 
work. See Marcelo Thompson, The Neutralization of Harmony: 
Whither the Good Information Environment? (forthcoming). For 
Google's approach, see Bob Boorstin, Promoting Free Trade for the 
Internet Economy, GOOGLE PUBLIC POLICY BLOG (Nov. 15, 2010, 
10:07 AM ET), http://goo.gl/zFz8U. 
16. One may rush to claim that challenging China‘s policies with 
regard to the information environment is to do liberalism a favour. One 
should also note, however, that to nullify China‘s possibilities of 
making any choices on conceptions of the good in this regard – which 
is entailed in neutrality claims – is a self-defeating way of promoting 
liberalism. I enlarge on this point in Part IV. 
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information environment, certain values that contemporary 
liberalism came to understand as worthy of protection. The 
challenge to individuals and the collective does not happen 
directly, by stripping these of possibilities for authoring 
their lives, pursuing goals they believe valuable.  
Of course, in the Google Books case, though the 
biggest challenge had been to the institutions of copyright 
law, authors and publishers had their rights, to some extent, 
usurped by Google.
17
 A normative inversion was attempted 
which would presume the righteousness of Google‘s 
behaviour, resulting, to some extent, in the subjection of 
rights‘ holders to Google‘s will. And yet, serious though it 
is to have parts of one's books searchable against their will, 
rights‘ holders were not shackled, divested of their central 
reasons and pursuits.
18
 But this is precisely what network 
neutrality does to ISPs. 
The idea of network neutrality hurts liberalism at its 
very core by establishing, for ISPs, a form of restraint that 
paradigmatically inverts the logic of the liberal principle. It 
does not merely impinge upon, it disfigures the idea of 
liberty by preventing important social agents from choosing 
their reasons for action – in this case, their criteria for 
managing their networks. And as the calls for neutrality 
extend, beyond ISPs, to other actors in the information 
environment, this othering of liberty threatens to become 
the normative touchstone of a remarkably individualistic 
age. 
                                                 
17. And this in spite of Google‘s expedient observations, 
somewhere else, that Copyright law in the US, including the DMCA, 
reflects ―a delicate balance, carefully crafted by Congress and 
adjudicated through the courts‖. Reply Comments of Google Inc. at 72, 
In re Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 09-191; Broadband 
Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Apr. 26, 2010), available at 
http://goo.gl/xY8YF [hereinafter Comments]. 
18. Were this to happen, it would be the product of a building up 
of different challenges to the law – and not as an absolutist, all-
encompassing challenge to any individual actor in the information 
environment. 
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In effect, everywhere we see the Internet mob 
calling for the neutralization of states and economic actors. 
The underlying principle seems to be that no authority but 
that of the individual self should be recognized. As in a late 
reverberation of outworn liberal theory of the past centuries 
– which is embraced and bolstered by the scholarship and 
practical contrivances
19
 developed by colleagues at the 
Berkman Center – the call of the time is for having 
―individuals as the bearers of the claims of political 
morality‖.20 This is all the most visible in the network 
neutrality movement. 
Despite the ardency with which clamours for 
network neutrality have been echoed by the multitude, the 
principle is yet to see actual implementation. It is 
important, however, that we enlarge on its proposed 
contours so that we can understand the normative 
implications that would have accrued from the principle 
had it been implemented – and may still do if it ever is. 
Understanding these implications, as we will see further on, 
is of central importance when we seek to define the 
political destiny of our information environment. 
 
A. GOOGLE‘S MANIFESTO 
 
Google‘s original network neutrality defence can only be 
found today in the historical archives of the Internet.
21
 
                                                 
19. See, e.g., STOPBADWARE, http://goo.gl/JuKI4 (last visited Jul. 
06, 2011), HERDICT, http://goo.gl/frGL8 (last visited Jul. 06, 2011) and 
CHILLING EFFECTS, http://goo.gl/MpQXj (last visited Jul. 06, 2011) – at 
least two of which count on Google as their foremost collaborator. 
20. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 281 (2006). 
21. Google's original evangelization page – ―A Guide to Net 
Neutrality for Google Users‖ – can only, indeed, be found in the 
Internet Archive, its latest version being of Sep. 27, 2009. See Google 
Inc., A Guide to Net Neutrality for Google Users, GOOGLE.COM (Sep. 
25, 2009), http://goo.gl/PWLrY [hereinafter Guide]. The paradox that 
Google would seek to remove information from public access is 
notable. When one queries the old URL one is simply redirected to 
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Network neutrality is there defined, through its effects, as 
―the principle that users should be in control of what 
content they view and what applications they use on the 
Internet‖. Interestingly, though the seeming kind-
heartedness towards users, the only mentioned means to 
achieve the said effects is reflected in the following 
precept: ―broadband carriers should not be permitted to use 
their market power to discriminate against competing 
applications or content‖. This shifts the focus, from 
protecting users, towards restraining ISPs. And, though the 
chosen wording, it seems to aim at restraining ISPs even 
beyond competition aspects. 
It is indeed difficult to disentangle the expression 
―use of market power‖ in the context above from the sheer 
performance of ISPs‘ core activities. ISPs hold the power of 
routing information through the Internet, which entails, by 
corollary, the power of not doing so. The making of 
decisions on if and how to route information seems thus to 
be enough to characterize the exercise of power in a market 
context. Similarly, ―competing content‖ seems able to 
accommodate any content discriminated by an ISP – that is, 
any content, which competes with content that has not been 
discriminated. Of course, the latter expression assumes 
more strength if the discriminated content is one which 
competes with that of the ISP itself or companies vertically 
integrated with the ISP‘s activities. In all the range of its 
meaning, however, Google‘s proposition seems to indicate, 
broadly and simply, that ISPs should not be permitted to 
discriminate applications or content on the Internet; that 
control of the flow of information on the Internet should 
not be entrusted to ISPs. As Google puts somewhere else in 
the now extinct document ―broadband carriers should not 
                                                                                                 
Google‘s justifications for its changed position. For the old address, see 
http://goo.gl/PWLrY (last visited Jul. 06, 2011). For the new address, 
just look for the old at http://www.google.com/help/netneutrality.html 
(last visited Jul. 06, 2011). 
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be allowed to use their market power to control activity 
online‖.22 
Two questions follow from this. First, if the 
objective is truly that of putting users in control, why 
should only ISPs be obliged by a rule that neutralizes their 
possibility of acting upon reasons chosen by them? Why 
are not application and service providers, in particular 
Google, equally constrained by a principle of neutrality? 
Second, is the idea of neutralizing any actor in the 
information environment compatible with the orientations 
of contemporary liberal politics? I will offer some tentative 
replies to these questions in Parts III and IV, respectively. 
I will introduce, however, the first question in more 
detail in the lines below, as we seek to ascertain the 
normative boundaries of Google's more formal position on 
the regulation of ISPs. This position expands and precise 
Google's original orientations in its Guide to Net Neutrality 
under a new terminological orientation. In it, Google lays 
out its calls for ISPs' restraint in an awkward – and 
extremely telling – systematic perspective. Let us 
understand how. 
 
B. THE ―MURKINESS‖ OF JUSTICE 
 
It is at the core of Google‘s activities – as it is of ISPs' – to 
make judgments about attributes of data it deals with. 
Should a principle of restraint neutralize Google‘s 
possibilities of doing so? The answer to such a question 
must go beyond Google itself and also include other 
application and service providers. After all, all of these are 
part of an Internet whose layers are in continuous 
interaction and whose actors have reciprocal impacts on the 
services of each other. However, given Google‘s prominent 
political role and its leadership in the network neutrality 
movement it seems but natural that scrutiny would at some 
point turn against Google itself – not only to test whether 
                                                 
22. Id. 
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Google walks its own talk but also, and perhaps mainly, as 
a consequence of Google‘s immense possibilities of 
interfering with the individualistic desires of the Internet 
crowd. And indeed, by the time Google surprisingly 
―modified‖ its stance on the topic, in August 2010,23 public 
calls for neutrality had more assertively started to include 
Google's activities as well. 
On July 2010 the New York Times ran an editorial 
called ―The Google Algorithm‖,24 in which it noted the 
need to adopt regulation to ensure that Google's tweaks in 
its algorithms do not prevent Google from leading us where 
we want to go. While the Editorial did not explicitly 
contain a call for Google's neutrality it was widely read as 
containing such. As in acknowledgement of such a reading, 
a response to the Editorial was promptly published in the 
Financial Times by Marissa Mayer, Google's Vice-President 
of Search and Product Experience, in which she attempted 
to explain why regulators should not step in to enforce 
'search neutrality'. In the piece, titled ―Do not neutrali[z]e 
the web‘s endless Search‖,25 Mayer claimed that neutrality 
rules "remove[...] the potential for innovation and turn[...] 
search into a commodity".
26
 
Mayer‘s choice of words was not coincidental. 
Rather, title and content of her short piece were pondered 
and reflective of an ongoing movement that started to 
become more material when Google first joined efforts with 
Verizon, in October 2009. In a statement of common 
                                                 
23. Joint Proposal, supra note 12. 
24. Editorial, The Google Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 15, 2010, at 
A30, available at http://goo.gl/n9TcV. 
25. Marissa Mayer, Do Not Neutralize the Web's Endless Search, 
FT.COM – FINANCIAL TIMES (Jul. 14, 2010, 11:19 PM), 
http://goo.gl/PA6sg. 
26. It is ironic, and we will come back to this point, that Google 
sees its own services as innovating while others‘ – those that should be 
neutralized – are seen as mere commodity. 
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grounds issued at the time by both companies,
27
 neither 
committed to neutrality, but rather to promoting an Open 
Internet. Shortly after, in January 2010, Google released its 
most official and important comments so far on the matter 
(Comments),
28
 in the context of a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) issued by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) in October 2009.
29
 
There, again, Google‘s notes on network neutrality were 
merely tangential as the Comments moved from a 
neutrality-based approach towards a formal call for 
awesomeness.
30
 
It might be tempting to think that the terminological 
shift represented a paradigmatic normative conversion – 
from a doctrine of neutral concern to a virtues-based 
approach; from the neutral towards the good, or the 
awesome. But the episode rather reveals the always all too 
close proximity between doctrines of neutrality and 
substantive world-views about what the good, in political 
terms, is. Google's commitments have always been, in 
effect, to particular reasons, to conceptions of the good 
reflected in a political framework that enables it to avail its 
                                                 
27. Eric Schmidt & Lowell McAdam, Finding Common Ground 
in an Open Internet, GOOGLE PUBLIC POLICY BLOG (Oct. 21 2009, 
06:15 PM ET), http://goo.gl/cdBoi. 
28. Comments, supra note 17. FCC‘s authority in this context was 
later challenged and found against in Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 
642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Comcast], a case concerning the 
interruption of BitTorrent traffic by Comcast, whose behaviour was 
reprimanded in a 2008 Order issued by the FCC (Formal Complaint of 
Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008) [hereinafter Comcast Order]). For 
an analysis of the D.C. Circuit‘s decision finding against the FCC, see 
Marcelo Thompson, The Sheriff of ‘Not-the-Internet’: Reflections on 
Comcast Corp. v FCC, 1:1 Communications Law Review 201 (2010) 
(Br.). 
29. In re Preserving the Open Internet: Broadband Industry 
Practices, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 24 FCC Rcd. 13064 (2009) 
[hereinafter NPRM]. 
30. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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users with (only apparently) boundless informational 
choices. It is based on these views that Google seeks to 
neutralize alternative procedural and substantive 
possibilities for the information environment. But Google 
can still implement its world view while abandoning a 
terminology – that of neutrality – which was threatening to 
engulf its own services. 
It was thus perhaps to close the terminological 
Pandora's box it had opened, perhaps to prepare the 
grounds for the broader partnership with Verizon it would 
soon announce, that Google decided to abandon neutrality 
as a term of art, conveying its policy propositions in 
different wording. The spirit, however, was still the same. 
As put in its Comments: 
―[Google‘s] interest in this proceeding is 
straightforward: to keep the Internet 
awesome for everybody. 
The Internet was designed to empower users. 
They are in control of the applications and 
services they use and create. And they – not 
network providers or anyone else – decide 
what ultimately succeeds in the online 
market‖.31 
Note that, on the one hand, Google reserves for itself the 
role of preserving awesomeness – which necessarily 
encompasses deciding upon whatever awesomeness is. On 
the other hand, Google sees the original design of the 
Internet as one for which no one but users – and, if the first 
sentence obtains, Google – makes choices of ultimate 
value. Such is the awesome model which Google believes 
should be preserved. 
Now, it may seem that when the Comments 
mentioned that network providers – ISPs – should not be 
entitled to make decisions, this was meant as an 
                                                 
31. Comments, supra note 17, at. i. 
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exaggeration, something to be taken with a pinch of salt. 
That, however, does not happen to have been the case, for 
the Comments proposed what was called a ―simple 
nondiscrimination‖ rule,32 similar to the propositions of 
Google‘s earlier, more informal Guide. According to the 
―simple nondiscrimination rule‖ ISPs should be prevented 
from using their control over the network to favor or 
disadvantage particular sources of content or applications – 
in other words, ISPs should be prevented from using their 
position in the network to manage the network. As 
explained in the Comments, the ―‗simple 
nondiscrimination‘ rule prevents broadband providers from 
blocking, degrading, or prioritizing Internet traffic‖.33 
Justifications given for so were the critical nature of 
broadband access as a basic component of communications 
infrastructure, the scarce nature of broadband resources due 
to demand of enormous up-front investments, and the 
power held by ISPs to control the upper layers of the 
Internet
34
 – where, to use FCC's terminology, Edge 
Providers
35
 lie. Let us leave alone for now that all these 
same reasons could be applied, conversely, to Google itself. 
Let us also forget for a bit that, when highlighting recent 
bad behaviour by ISPs, Google gave as an example of its 
good behaviour its commitment to openness through its 
investment in the Android operating system – which, 
ironically, Google has recently decided to close.
36
 
What is important to be grasped at this point is the 
absolute nature of the restraints sought to be imposed to 
                                                 
32. Id. at ii, 3 and 60-63. 
33. Id. at 3. 
34. Id. at 13-26. 
35. In its recently issued Open Internet Rules the FCC uses the 
expression 'edge providers' ―to refer to content, application, service, and 
device providers, because they generally operate at the edge rather than 
the core of the network‖. See infra note 60, at 3 n.2. 
36. See Ryan Paul, Android Openness Withering as Google 
Withholds Honeycomb, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 25, 2011, 08:26 AM), 
http://goo.gl/tu0dP. 
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ISPs. This can be seen very eloquently in the Comments‘ 
endorsement of a statement in the NPRM which expresses, 
as a principle of ―User Control of Content‖, that users 
should be “unconstrained by broadband Internet access 
providers in their ability to participate in the marketplace of 
ideas‖.37 It is important to note that the idea of 
unconstrained users implies completely constrained ISPs. 
The principle, thus, is that ISPs cannot choose reasons of 
their own in deciding upon how to manage their networks. 
The reasons available to ISPs would be fully heteronomous 
reasons, ex-ante defined by the FCC as valid and picked 
from a very narrow spectrum outlined in the Comments. It 
is in this sense that the Comments speak of "delineated 
permissible network management practices",
38
 preferring 
the simplicity of absolute impossibility to the ―murkiness‖ 
of justice as a standard. As it puts, 
―Adopting an ‗unjust and unreasonable 
discrimination‘ standard and reasonable 
network management exception would 
establish a more murky [sic], complex, and 
likely ineffectual legal standard‖.39 
To put it differently, it is not that ISPs should be allowed to 
operate within certain principles of justice and expected to 
make choices which are practically reasonable.
40
 It is, 
                                                 
37. Comments, supra note 17, at 56; NPRM, supra note 29, para. 
95. 
38. Comments, id. at 60. 
39. Id. at 62. 
40. Practical reason is here referred to in a technical sense, as ―the 
general human capacity for resolving, through reflection, the question 
of what one is to do‖ (R. Jay Wallace, Practical Reason, STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 13, 2003), http://goo.gl/lPNWV), 
and as involving all the normative elements, the comprehensive world-
views that we discuss in the upcoming sections. For a persuasive and 
insightful account on the requirements of practical reason, see John 
Finnis, The Foundations of Practical Reason Revisited, 50 AM. J. JURIS. 
109 (2005), or, more generally, JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND 
NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). 
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rather, that such principles and choices are not available to 
ISPs at all, except as narrowly dictated by the FCC. 
Autonomy is thus fully replaced by heteronomy. 
The most patently absurd reason given in the 
Comments for such an absolute form of restraint is that a 
‗simple nondiscrimination‘ rule as the one proposed is 
―easier to understand and requires less enforcement 
expense and resources‖.41 A reasoning in all similar to this 
would be one that is as unsubtle as Google's proposition: 
since bondage eliminates the normative uncertainty that 
could arise from entrusting bondsmen with the possibility 
of choosing their reasons for action, one can say that wider 
social benefits accrue from bondage than from liberty. We 
see well at which cost such sort of certainty would come. 
Though the Comments do contemplate, as said, the 
possibility of the FCC defining a number of reasons 
according to which ISPs can manage their networks, these 
are restricted to a ―narrow set of reasonable network 
management practices, limited solely to engineering 
practices legitimately related to network congestion‖.42 But 
even here ISPs‘ possibilities are minimized as: i) the 
―optimal solution‖ suggested by the Comments are, rather 
than reasoning, the sheer ―addition of capacity on the 
network level‖;43 and, most importantly, ii) ISPs are not 
even entitled to interpret the law, since compliance of 
content with the law is understood not to be an issue 
―related to network management at all‖.44 
The latter restriction being true, one wonders what 
to make of the few possibilities in which the Comments do 
provide for the adoption of network management practices, 
                                                 
41. Comments, supra note 17, at 63. 
42. Id. at 68. 
43. Id. at 69. 
44. ―A separate network management exception for ‗unlawful 
content‘ and the ‗unlawful transfer of content‘ is unnecessary. (…) 
[T]hese issues are not related to network management at all, but rather 
are properly matters of law enforcement and compliance with the law‖ 
(id. at 72). 
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such as to prevent ―malware‖, block ―spam‖ and ―protect 
children from offensive materials (e.g., pornography)‖.45 It 
is curious indeed that ISPs are in this sense allowed to 
address the intersection between the technological 
(engineering practices) and the ethical (the mal-, in 
malware), but need to interpret the ethical completely bereft 
of legal reasons. In other words, Google‘s strange 
liberalism leads it to agree with several (albeit narrow and 
predetermined) modalities of decision by ISPs on 
conceptions of the good (for instance, determining which 
software, in being harmful, is bad)
46
 while denying to ISPs 
any possibility of decision on conceptions of the right (for 
instance, determining which software is illegal). 
Not only is this a very unique kind of liberal 
philosophy, it is one that does not make sense at all, for to 
exclude any interpretation of lawfulness from the realm of 
the ethical is to exclude from this same realm any 
possibility of reasoning upon those most severe forms of 
ethically deviant behavior that the law is concerned with. 
That is, while ISPs can manage their networks to prevent 
the trite, they may not do so spontaneously to avoid the 
atrocious when this is settled by the law. 
It is here very important to notice that decisions on 
what constitutes ―malware‖, for instance, are not merely 
engineering decisions. Google itself collaborates with a 
Harvard University-originated project called Stop Badware, 
a clearing house for stopping the spread of malware on the 
Internet.
47
 One does not need to go very far to understand 
how normative the definition of badware is. According to 
Stop Badware, ―[b]adware is software that fundamentally 
disregards a user‘s choice about how his or her computer or 
                                                 
45. Id. 
46. As the following lines will show, however differently one may 
understand the harm principle in other realms of practical reason, 
determining what is harmful in relation to informational goods 
inevitably engages our conceptions of the good in moral, political and 
otherwise cultural ways. 
47. See supra note 19. 
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network connection will be used‖.48 In other words, 
badware is software that imposes to users that same ideal 
that Google seeks to impose to ISPs and the world – 
heteronomy. 
It is further evidence of badware‘s, beyond 
technological, normative nature that Stop Badware alludes 
to it as ―a threat to the open Internet, one of our greatest 
political, economic, and cultural shared resources‖.49 
Hence, it is not surprising that Stop Badware would classify 
the Green Dam filtering software, whose installation in 
every PC in China was mandated by the government, as 
badware. The reason given for such a classification was that 
the software would "filter political speech without 
notice".
50
 A fair question to ask in this regard would be: in 
light of the extensive regulatory framework of the Internet 
in China, can one really say that enough notice was not 
given that filtering would occur? More directly related to 
our inquiry, however, is to note that the classification of the 
Green Dam software as badware because of its filtering of 
political speech is tantamount to classifying the whole 
techno-regulatory framework of the Internet in China as 
badware. Given the extent to which such a framework is 
intertwined with China‘s political system and nation-
building project
51
 one can see how deeply political the 
definition of badware is. 
                                                 
48. StopBadware Frequently Asked Questions, STOPBADWARE, 
http://goo.gl/8EA0I (last visited Jul. 06, 2011). 
49. About StopBadware, STOPBADWARE, http://goo.gl/ySHwH 
(last visited Jul. 06, 2011). 
50. China's Green Dam is BadWare and So Much More, THE 
STOPBADWARE BLOG (Jun. 13, 2009), http://goo.gl/xuxJw. 
51. See, e.g., YONGNIAN ZHENG, TECHNOLOGICAL 
EMPOWERMENT: THE INTERNET, STATE, AND SOCIETY IN CHINA (2008), 
arguing, on the one hand, that ―the development of science and 
technology has long been embedded in the mind-set of the Chinese elite 
regarding nation-state building‖ and, on the other hand, that the policies 
and practices of nation-state building in China at the same time 
―provide opportunities for the rise of social movements‖ (at 17). Both 
perspectives, for Zheng, interact in the constitution of what the political 
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It is thus a mistake to pretend that decisions on 
engineering of the Internet take place in separation from 
normative criteria – i.e. that ISPs may tackle network 
management as simply a matter of engineering. Elsewhere I 
have explained how the explicit articulation of normative 
expectations through technological artefacts renders it 
impossible for nation-states to ignore the processes by 
which these artefacts come into being – and thus the norms 
that they reflect and that are often determined by large 
scale, state-like enterprises.
52
 States, hence, cannot commit 
to neutrality without risking the demise of their already 
fading authority and the nullification of conceptions of the 
good whose pursuit is worthy of protection. And as much as 
states need to interpret such normative realities in the most 
different realms of societal happening – against the odds of 
much of earlier centuries liberal theories that would 
advocate for state neutrality – so need corporations, whose 
weaving of the technological infrastructure is constitutive 
of those realities. 
It is tempting to move here towards more in-depth 
discussions on Science and Technology Studies to explain 
the relations between the technological and the social. We 
need not do so, however. We can settle the matter that the 
engineering of the Internet has politics – and is otherwise 
normative – just by looking at the standards that preside 
over the Internet's development. The Internet Engineering 
Task Force, for instance, adopts clearly politico-normative 
orientations in defining not only the process by which 
Internet standards are approved but also the value that these 
must embrace. It is in this sense that its RFC 2026 – the 
meta-standard that sets the procedure for the making of 
standards – defines fairness as one of the goals of the 
                                                                                                 
in contemporary China is, all this being ―especially true in the case of 
… the Internet‖ (id.). 
52. See supra note 15. 
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Internet Standards Process.
53
 Similarly, the Internet Society 
– IETF's organizational home – speaks of an ―overarching 
principle of openness‖ and of choice, access and 
transparency as ―underlying policy principles‖ for the 
Internet. At the same time, it criticizes the idea of network 
neutrality as a ―broad and ill-defined term‖.54 
The first organization in charge of Internet 
governance to formally adopt network neutrality as a 
principle was the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee 
(CGI.Br), in a Resolution of 2009
55
 – albeit CGI.br's lack of 
any legally-backed enforcement attributions.
56
 Very 
interestingly, the way the principle was adopted in Brazil 
adds concrete weight to our discussions in this section. In 
its Resolution, CGI.br defined the principle as meaning that 
―Filtering or traffic privileges must meet ethical and 
technical criteria only, excluding any political, commercial, 
religious and cultural factors or any other form of 
discrimination or preferential treatment‖.57 As Google‘s 
peculiar philosophy, CGI.br‘s implies a separation between 
two different normative realms – here, the ethical and the 
political, admitting of filtering to attend to the former while 
                                                 
53. Scott Bradner, The Internet Standards Practice – Revision 3, 
IETF, RFC 2026 (Oct., 1996), para. 1.2., http://goo.gl/kmN3u. The 
reference is not merely to fairness as a procedural criteria for approving 
standards – which appears in another part of the RFC – but, 
substantively, to fairness as a goal of the standards process. With a 
similar reading, see KATHY BOWREY, LAW AND INTERNET CULTURES 1 
(2007). 
54. Internet Society, Open Inter-networking, (Feb. 21, 2010), at 2, 
available at http://goo.gl/zZ7Yx. 
55. Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br), Principles for 
the Governance and Use of the Internet‖, Resolution 
CGI.br/RES/2009/003/P (24 April 2009), available at 
http://goo.gl/MBPwz [hereinafter CGI.br's Resolution]. 
56. See Joaquim Falcão, Globalização e Judiciário: a 
Internalização das Normas de Nomes de Domínio, in CONFLITOS 
SOBRE NOMES DE DOMÍNIO: E OUTRAS QUESTÕES JURÍDICAS DA 
INTERNET 15 (Ronaldo Lemos & Ivo Waisberg eds., 2003). 
57. CGI.br's Resolution, supra note 55, § 6. 
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ruling it out entirely for the latter. Thus, while filtering for 
invasive ethical criteria would be allowed by CGI.br‘s 
Resolution – e.g. the filtering of homosexual content –, the  
assignment of privileges to content related to the political 
constitution of a society would be completely ruled out – 
e.g. quality of service assurances for traffic-intensive 
political material in times of presidential campaigning. 
An interesting answer to the ethical challenge posed 
above to CGI.br‘s Resolution could be that the filtering of 
homosexual content is not ethical, but rather anti-ethical 
and that ISPs cannot thus adopt homosexuality as a 
criterion for filtering content. But this then leaves with ISPs 
the power of deciding on the validity of ethical criteria 
adopted by them in the routing of Internet content. Granting 
ISPs the power of deciding so seems to be entirely at odds 
with the propositions of network neutrality advocates – and 
Google‘s proposition for an awesome Internet. And yet, it 
seems but natural that ISPs will examine the validity, the 
truth of the reasons they adopt. In effect, ISPs should be 
expected to do so, not only on ethical, but also on political, 
legal and any other normative grounds. 
This is not to attribute to ISPs the role of 
gatekeepers of public morality. Especially, this is not to 
avail ISPs with the power of effacing the boundaries 
between the public and the private in the information 
environment. Privacy standards, for instance, will be 
amongst the reasons that should inform action by ISPs. 
Prohibitions against specific discriminatory practices, if 
enacted, will be valid reasons as well. If ISPs overstep, 
checks and balances should be in place to address their 
excesses. This is one thing. To exclude any specific 
normative realm – or normative realms altogether – from 
the scope of the valid reasons that an ISP can adopt is a 
completely different thing. 
In sum, what should be taken from the lines above 
is, on the one hand, that the pretence that one can consider 
engineering criteria in isolation from other, normative 
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criteria does not obtain. Network engineering, even in its 
own, typical standards, is informed by notions such as 
harm, fairness and openness, which render it much more 
subjective than one may think in the first place. On the 
other hand, the same thoughts can be applied to the 
pretence that network management can be limited to only 
one or more normative – e.g. ethical – criteria. Neither can 
the political be ruled out, as proposed by CGI.br, nor can 
the legal, inter alia,
58
 be, as proposed by Google. Rather, 
reasoning in practical terms implies pursuing the truth 
amongst values that arise in the most diversified areas of 
societal happening. That some heteronomous criteria can be 
applied – for instance by the FCC – to ISPs does not mean 
that in any area ISPs should be precluded from reasoning or 
have their reasons presumed against. 
At the core of such reasoning lies the idea of justice, 
weaving an orderly fabric with the different reasons that 
ISPs – as other actors of the information environment – 
may validly pursue. Google sought to exclude justice due to 
its arguable murky nature. And yet one cannot interpret 
ideas of reasonable network management without resorting 
to principles of justice. There are two points we should 
understand in this regard. One point is more practical; the 
other, more philosophical. 
The practical point is that, from an FCC‘s earlier Internet 
Policy Statement of September 2005
59
 to date, for instance 
                                                 
58. One note is due here. Amongst other murky criteria that go 
beyond engineering – e.g. fairness and lawfulness – Google seeks to 
rule out the political. In practice, however, the political is only ruled out 
at Google's own convenience, for it continues to play a strong role 
through Google‘s own affiliated projects, such as StopBadware. 
59. In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the 
Internet Over Wireline Facilities; (...) Appropriate Regulatory 
Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, 
Policy Statement, 20 FCC Rcd at 14986 (2005) [hereinafter Policy 
Statement]. 
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in FCC‘s Open Internet Rules of December 2010,60 justice 
and reasonableness have neither been excluded nor treated 
by the FCC as exceptional elements in ISPs‘ reasoning. 
However differently Google may have wished in its 
Comments,
61
 the requirement of reasonable network 
management was rightly placed by the FCC at the very core 
of every action to be lawfully undertaken by ISPs. In other 
words, reason was demanded – and thus entrusted to –, 
rather than seized from ISPs. 
It was in this sense that the Policy Statement 
mentioned that ―[t]he principles [the FCC] adopt[s] are 
subject to reasonable network management‖.62 FCC‘s 
Rules, similarly, coupled a prohibition of blocking lawful 
content
63
 or nonharmful devices with a general requirement 
that every discriminating act be reasonable. There was, of 
course, no prohibition to interpret what the unlawful or the 
harmful are, for how could there be reasonableness without 
                                                 
60. In re Preserving the Open Internet: Broadband Industry 
Practices, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd 17905 (2010) [hereinafter 
Open Internet Rules or, simply, Rules]. 
61. For Google, instead of a reasonable network management 
requirement at the core of every principle, there should be a general 
prohibition against network management practices not explicitly 
delineated. Such a prohibition would then be coupled with a defence for 
those cases where it can be established that a network management 
practice is reasonable. In its Rules, however, the FCC understood that 
―principles guiding case-by-case evaluations of network management 
practices are much the same as those that guide assessments of ‗no 
unreasonable discrimination‘‖. Rules, supra note 60, para. 87. In other 
words, these principles do not work merely as a defence of reasonable 
network management for presumably unjustified network management 
practices. They work as a general rule of ―no unreasonable 
discrimination‖ for network management practices that are generally 
taken as reasonable, until otherwise established. 
62. Policy Statement, supra note 59, at 3 n.15. 
63. ―The rule protects only transmissions of lawful content, and 
does not prevent or restrict a broadband provider from refusing to 
transmit unlawful material such as child pornography‖. Rules, supra 
note 60, para. 64. 
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reason?
64
 Use-agnosticism – the non-discrimination 
between specific uses of the network – was defined as an 
indication of reasonableness but by no means a requirement 
of it. In other words, ISPs can still (sometimes they must)
65
 
discriminate between different uses, as long as they do so 
reasonably. Reasonableness was understood broadly, 
encompassing the prevention of harm, enablement of 
parental control and guarantee of network integrity – 
whatever that turns out to be.
66
 
And yet, somewhat disappointingly, albeit only 
topically, the FCC disentangled reasonableness from 
lawfulness in its definition of reasonable network 
management, noting: ―[w]e conclude that the definition of 
reasonable network management omit elements that do not 
relate directly to network management functions and are 
therefore better handled elsewhere in the rules—for 
example, measures to prevent the transfer of unlawful 
content‖.67 This does not mean, thus, that ISPs are 
prevented from evaluating the lawfulness or unlawfulness 
of content. It only means that this evaluation by ISPs will 
not be taken by the FCC as a criterion for deciding whether 
a network management practice is reasonable or not – 
which is a strange and indeed disappointing outcome, for, 
even if the factual effects of this policy will be limited, the 
normative significance of saying that understanding 
reasonableness prescinds from understanding lawfulness is 
worthy of notice. 
                                                 
64. The FCC noted its ―disagree[ment] with commenters who 
argue that a standard based on ―reasonableness‖ or ―unreasonableness‖ 
is too vague to give broadband providers fair notice of what is expected 
of them‖. In its words, ―[t]his is not so. Reasonableness‖ is a well-
established standard for regulatee conduct‖. Rules, id., para. 77. 
65. Albeit the Rules (id.) establish no independent requirement 
that they do so. 
66. Does the integrity of networks encompass, for instance, IETF 
RFC 2026‘s goal of a fair Internet? See supra note 53. 
67. Rules, supra note 60, para. 82. 
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This brings us to the second, more philosophical 
point which needs to be made about network management. 
This point speaks more widely to the nihilistic, arguably 
pragmatic posture of network neutralists in general – and 
may prompt them to question their anti-normative instance.  
The idea is the following: in much of contemporary 
legal theory, the understanding of law as command (the so-
called command theory of law) has been replaced by 
another understanding according to which law provides 
people with reasons for action. Law, in this sense, mediates 
amongst different reasons we hold
68
 in the process of 
thinking about what to chose and do – i.e. in the process of 
practical reason.
69
 In mediating, law modifies the scope of 
other considerations,
70
 it impinges upon the reasons that 
people would otherwise hold. Legal reasoning cannot thus 
be dissociated from the overall process of practical reason. 
For it modifies the normative order, for it is reflected in the 
common institutions of everyday life, law presents itself to 
us not merely episodically but every time we reason in 
practical terms. How can thus lawfulness be thought of as 
something to be disentangled from reasonableness – by 
ISPs or by any other agent? 
There are, of course, diverging views on the 
relations between legal reasons and other reasons upon 
which law impinges. Some see – rather than a process of 
exclusion – a process of confluence, of identity between the 
reasons of law and other reasons of practical nature. Under 
this view, the reasons provided by law are inherently 
connected with the reasons of morality, justice, politics – in 
                                                 
68. In Joseph Raz's ―service conception of authority‖, the 
authority of law stems from the service it provides in ―mediating 
between people and the right reasons which apply to them‖. JOSEPH 
RAZ, ETHICS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 214 (1994). 
69. See supra note 40. 
70. Joseph Raz, Incorporation by Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 1, at 9 
(2004) (UK) (―What happens … is that law modifies the way morality 
applies to people. … [L]aw modifies … the way moral considerations 
apply‖). 
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effect, these are one and the same reasons in the central 
case of what we must understand by law. It is based on such 
‗central case viewpoint‘ that John Finnis presents his 
idealized, but nonetheless very persuasive thoughts: 
―[T]he central case viewpoint itself is the viewpoint of 
those who not only appeal to practical reasonableness, 
but also are practically reasonable, that is to say: 
consistent; attentive to all aspects of human opportunity 
and flourishing, and aware of their limited 
commensurability; concerned to remedy deficiencies and 
breakdowns, and aware of their roots in the various 
aspects of human personality and in the economic and 
other material conditions of social interaction. What 
reason could the descriptive theorist have for rejecting 
the conceptual choices and discriminations of these 
persons, when he is selecting the concepts with which he 
will construct his description of [law‘s] central case and 
then of all the other instances of law as a specific social 
institution?‖.71 
In sum, in being practically reasonable – in managing their 
networks reasonably, how can ISPs ignore all these aspects 
entailed by practical reason and, in its central case, by law? 
One may frown, however, on ISPs adopting this 
more comprehensive view of the relations between law and 
other normative realms – in particular the relations between 
law and morality. And yet, this does not do away with the 
fact that ISPs will still need to identify what the law is 
when choosing their reasons for action. Whether there is an 
identity between the legal and the moral realms or not, law 
does translate the moral with its own, legal lenses – as it 
does with the political, the economic and all other social 
systems which it, at the same time, functionally 
differentiates itself from and holds a functional relationship 
with – which Niklas Luhmann terms ―structural 
                                                 
71. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 
40, at 15. 
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coupling‖.72 For Luhmann, the specific function performed 
by law is the stabilization of normative expectations,
73
 
which law translates from other social systems and reflects 
in a coding of its own. 
It may be that Finnis or Luhmann, different as these 
authors‘ views may be, do not meet the pragmatic intents of 
those who want to advocate either the FCC‘s form of 
normative restraint – to say reasonableness does not 
encompass lawfulness – or Google‘s more wild version of 
it – to say that ISPs, besides not engaging with the law, 
must not adopt any murky, non-strictly engineering criteria 
either, such as those of justice, politics, amongst others. 
It may be that network neutrality pragmatists still do 
not agree that it is not possible to exclude legal criteria 
from practical reason in general, and vice-versa. They may 
not agree: i) that ISPs can only exclude law from 
reasonableness if they ignore social institutions altogether – 
for legal reasons are always embedded in these; that, 
whereas Google is concerned with complexity, it may be 
more paralysing for ISPs to try to disentangle legal reasons 
from, inter alia, those based on harm than just to look for 
what is reasonable in these realms altogether; and ii) that, if 
only legal criteria were admitted, ISPs still would have 
difficulties in excluding political or moral criteria from 
legal ones; that this would also be paralysing. We may 
close this section with a note in this regard. 
Perhaps pragmatists of the sort above may be in 
pursuit of a more objective theory of law; one that rejects 
incorporation of other normative criteria – for instance, of 
moral criteria – by law. In other words, even if Google 
admit of the adoption of legal criteria by ISPs – which it 
                                                 
72. NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 140 (Klaus A. 
Ziegert transl.; Fatima Kastner, Richard Nobles, David Schiff & 
Rosamund Ziegert eds., 2004) (―This does not mean, as one might 
suspect at first glance, that the legal system and the political system 
form one system together. But they do resort to special forms of 
structural coupling and are linked to each other through that coupling‖).  
73. Id., at 142-172. 
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currently does not –, that should be as far as ISPs should be 
able to go. The most likely theoretical model for 
pragmatists of this sort to pursue is a form of legal 
positivism – exclusive legal positivism of a Razian kind, 
which both rejects the thesis of the incorporation of 
morality by law and, as a corollary, defends that the 
identification of law does not depend on the evaluation of 
its moral merits.
74
 
But even here Google would still face two 
important challenges. The first is that not even exclusive 
legal positivists would deny that law reflects political 
criteria. As Joseph Raz notes, ―legal positivists endorse the 
model of rules because of a political theory about the 
functions of law‖.75 In effect, law claims of authority to 
mediate amongst different reasons for action cannot but be 
political through and through. If ISPs are entitled to apply 
legal criteria as a matter of reasonableness it is unavoidable 
that political criteria will be applied as well. 
A concrete example may help us to see this. Think 
of the GreenDam software, mentioned above. The 
classification of the GreenDam as badware necessarily 
relies on a disregard for the legitimacy of the regulations of 
the Chinese Communist Party; on a refutation of their 
validity as law. And challenging the validity of the laws of 
China is obviously a challenge of political nature. Even if 
                                                 
74. According to this view, as much as one can identify a service 
in the church, even being an agnostic, just by looking at its important 
features, so can the morally impious still understand what the law is 
just by looking at its sources, without sharing moral convictions of any 
sort (The example is given by JULIE DICKSON in her EVALUATION AND 
LEGAL THEORY 68-69 (2001)). Moral criteria, for Raz, concern law's 
legitimacy, the acceptance of its legal propositions, but are foreign to 
and modified by the legal propositions one accepts. In sum, law, in 
being accepted as law, impinges upon morality, but does not 
incorporate morality and can thus be identified without resort to it. See 
Joseph Raz, supra notes 68, 70. 
75. Raz, supra note 68, at 235. In this excerpt, as not very often 
happens, Raz is citing Ronald Dworkin approvingly, which shows just 
how much of a platitude the point is. 
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one is unwilling to generally see the political in law, one 
cannot deny that if ISPs are allowed to filter the distribution 
of the GreenDam as badware – or, say, to facilitate the 
traffic of data in circumvention to the wider system of 
techno-political filtering in place in China – the challenge 
to the authority of the laws of China will not be but a 
political challenge as well. 
The second, none the less important challenge here 
is that, whatever critiques one may level against legal 
positivism's separation between law and morality, it is 
wrong to assume that legal positivism invites any actor in 
society, from dutiful officials to anarchical programmers, to 
abandon the pursuits of moral criteria altogether in doing 
law or living life. Neither does legal positivism deny the 
incorporation of political criteria by law, nor does it invite 
us to, in living a successful life by the law, abandon the 
pursuit of moral values at all. These are rare theoretical 
privileges that only Google can claim for its own theory of 
law and action – or, rather, for its lack thereof. 
  
 
III. SUBJUGATING LAYERS 
 
In the lines above we have examined the internal 
incoherence of attempts to neutralize a category of actors of 
the Information environment – ISPs. We have demonstrated 
how these attempts are carried out and, hopefully, how 
nonsensical the undertaking, altogether, is. We can now 
advance towards our last claims in this article. These are, 
on the one hand, that there is no justification for treating 
ISPs differently from actors in other layers of the 
Information environment and, on the other hand, that the 
attempt to neutralize any actor of the information 
environment is incompatible with the orientations of 
contemporary liberal politics. We engage with the latter 
claim in Part IV. In the lines below we focus on the 
problem of differentiation. 
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A. SEPARATE BUT EQUAL 
 
In its Open Internet Rules, the Federal Communications 
Commission noted that ―[t]here is one Internet, which 
should remain open for consumers and innovators alike‖.76 
The precise achievement of the neutralization of ISPs, 
however, would be a split of the Internet, as we know it, 
into two unknown ones. At the top, where edge providers, 
like Google, are, a layer of unconstrained possibilities; at 
the bottom, where ISPs labour, a sheet of serfdom. As a 
whole, an inversion of Newton's ―standing in the shoulders 
of giants‖ allegory, for here ISPs have giants standing on 
theirs. 
The division of the Internet in layers is but a 
thought exercise of engineers and policymakers.
77
 The 
layers do not exist if not as a logical artefact for aiding our 
intuitions about the Internet and helping us set the standards 
for its development. The Internet is a normative whole. The 
loose and symbiotic association of different actors in a 
large-scale, world-encompassing informational grid gives 
the Internet a normative unity that enables us to recognize it 
as the Internet.
78
 And such is a normative unity that at the 
                                                 
76. Rules, supra note 60, para. 93. 
77. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF 
THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 23 (2001) (noting how the 
idea of layers helps us to organize our thoughts). 
78. As Searls and Weinberger argue ―[t]he Internet isn't a thing. 
It's an agreement‖. Doc Searls & David Weinberger, World of Ends: 
What the Internet Is and How to Stop Mistaking It for Something Else 
(Oct. 03, 2003), http://goo.gl/fUVyk. Of course, we need to understand 
this as an exaggeration, for the Internet is enacted in different 
dimensions, including, beyond that of conventions, also the tangible 
dimension that John Law calls the Euclidean topology. It is, thus, a 
thing, an object in all these dimensions. See John Law, Objects and 
Spaces, 19:5-6 THEORY, CULTURE & SOCIETY 91 (2002). The unity of 
what we call the Internet, however, is indeed conventional. It is given 
by the syntactical network through which we normatively enact the 
Internet, as an agreement, a meeting of minds – and thus of reasons. 
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same time allows us to navigate and reflects the structure of 
our relations in contemporary society – with all the same 
treats of fragmentation that are everywhere inherent to 
these relations. 
Now, if law intervenes to nullify the reasons of any 
of the agents in the ecosystem it will be in effect ruling 
such an agent out of the central normative representation of 
our society and of ourselves that the Internet is. Of course, 
law does need to intervene to remedy normative 
perturbations that threaten to fragment the wider project of 
social cohesion. Law will need to regulate the activities of 
ISPs as it also needs to regulate the activities of every other 
actor of the information environment. This is one thing. But 
to nullify the prospects that ISPs will act with autonomy in 
choosing the reasons with which to contribute to this wider 
project of normative unity is another thing altogether. 
The neutralization of ISPs thus excludes their 
membership to the information environment. It dissociates 
them from what we call the Internet – or at least it renders 
the division of the Internet in layers, more than a thought 
exercise, a tangible reality of domination. In other words, if 
ISPs are neutralized, either we term the space occupied by 
them as something that is ―not the Internet‖79 or we indeed 
                                                 
79. Very symptomatically, in a submission to the FCC last year 
during a consultation following the Comcast decision, a group of 
influential academics and supporters of network neutrality invited the 
Commission to acknowledge that the transmission component of ISPs' 
services is not part of the Internet, opening way for the Commission to 
regulate these services. In the authors' words, ―carriers‘ assertions that 
the Commission would be regulating 'the Internet' [by regulating the 
transmission component of their services] are deliberately misleading‖. 
Marvin Ammori, Susan Crawford & Tim Wu, Submission to the 
Federal Communications Commission at 7-8, In re Preserving the Open 
Internet, GN Docket No. 09-191; Broadband Industry Practices, WC 
Docket No. 07-52; A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, GN 
Docket No. 09-51 (Apr. 30, 2010 ). The FCC had considered this idea 
(abandoning it later) in the consultation, noting that, in regulating ISPs' 
transmissions, it would not be regulating the Internet: ―[G]eneral 
agreement has developed about the agency‘s light-touch role with 
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understand that there are two completely different layers in 
the Internet – one of dark, restricted boundaries within 
which ISPs wander; and other of luminous, endless 
possibilities that ISPs shoulder. 
And such would be a heavy burden indeed. It is thus 
surprising to find in the scholarly literature the information 
that only the lower layers of the Internet are capable of 
constraining the upper layers, not the other way round.
80
 
Why would the need of managing networks even arise for 
ISPs if the upper layers had no effects upon their own?  
 
An example may help us to make the point. One of the 
requirements recently imposed by FCC's Rules to ISPs was 
that of transparency.
81
 In the realm of search, however, such 
is a requirement to which Google much objects with regard 
to its own engine. Google does so due to the possibility that 
linking farms, Google bombs and, in general, black hat 
―Search Engine Optimizers‖ will use such wealth of 
information to game Google's algorithms and appear high 
in Google's Page Rank.
82
 But can't the same be said of ISPs' 
networks? 
                                                                                                 
respect to broadband communications. ... The Commission does not 
regulate the Internet‖. Austin Schlick, A Third-Way Legal Framework 
for Addressing the Comcast Dilemma, BROADBAND.GOV (May 06, 
2010), available at http://goo.gl/0jnat.  For a critique, see Thompson, 
supra note 28. 
80. See, e.g., ANDREW MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF 
CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 45 (2007) (noting, 
based on Benkler, that ―vertical regulation is only effective from the 
bottom-up, that is regulation in a supporting layer is effective in the 
layers above, but does not affect the layers below‖). 
81. See supra note 60, paras. 53 ff..  
82. On Google's Transparency Report website, data related to 
transparency actually refers not to Google itself but to Governments 
who may create hurdles to the provision of Google's services – by 
means of user information requests, information filtering or 
infrastructure outage. See Google Inc., Transparency Report, 
GOOGLE.COM, http://goo.gl/uplzX (last visited Jul. 08, 2011). See also, 
e.g., JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, The FUTURE OF THE INTERNET : AND HOW TO 
STOP IT 220 (2008) (―Search engines are notoriously resistant to 
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Imagine if, besides a requirement of transparency, a 
full-blooded non-discrimination requirement had been 
established by the FCC, with no exceptions, for ISPs. 
Obviously, absent any constraints, application providers 
would be able to use the wealth of information available 
about ISPs' networks to game and exploit these to the 
fullest. One can think of Skype, Spotify, World of Warcraft 
and other bandwidth-harvesting applications deploying 
powerful algorithms to make complete use of available 
bandwidth. That would leave no choice to ISPs other than 
monitoring new entrants in the applications market and 
constantly increasing the capacity of their networks to meet 
the interests of these. That, as seen above, had in fact been 
precisely – if incredibly – Google's proposal for the 
regulation of ISPs, by electing ―addition of capacity on the 
network level‖ as the ―optimal solution‖ for solving 
network congestion. 
The FCC hinted at this point in its 2008 Order to 
Comcast and yet has never addressed the contradiction ever 
since. In the Order, the FCC noted that Comcast could 
―work with the application vendors themselves‖ and quoted 
comments stating that ―[i]f Comcast made 'available 
information on what it considers the peak periods of 
network traffic … it would not be difficult for the authors 
of BitTorrent [– the application which was being blocked 
by Comcast –] to modify their programs to query a 
Comcast server to determine what is the best time to 
upload/download data‖'.83 It did not consider, however, 
perhaps due to its foreseeable lack of authority, the 
alternative of also regulating edge providers. 
                                                                                                 
discussing how their rankings work, in part to avoid gaming—a form of 
security through obscurity. … The most popular engines reserve the 
right to intervene in their automatic rankings processes—to administer 
the Google death penalty, for example—but otherwise suggest that they 
do not centrally adjust results‖). 
83. Comcast Order, note 28 supra para. 49 and fn229. 
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Republican Commissioner McDowell's Statement 
on the occasion, however – and for more democrat that that 
the ideals that run through this article may be – were much 
more in line with our notes above. He observed, on the one 
hand, that ―applications providers could do a better job of 
designing software that works more efficiently on networks 
that were designed and built sometimes decades ago‖. 84 On 
the other hand, McDowell remarked that ―we are 
witnessing a deepening division between some in the 
application industry and some network operators‖.85 
This was also possibly the view of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the 
decision that quashed FCC's Order in Comcast. In that case, 
the Court understood that, if the Commission were to 
regulate ISPs, it could not do so with regard to cable 
Internet services per se.
86
 One of the avenues not ruled out 
by the D.C. Circuit, however, is the regulation of cable 
Internet services for the impact these have on regulated, 
common carrier and broadcasting services.
87
 Currently, 
                                                 
84. Order, supra note 28, at 61 (Statement of Comm’r Robert M. 
McDowell). His example of P2P applications is particularly relevant: 
―The providers of certain peer-to-peer (P2P) applications, for example, 
could do a better job of making consumers aware that their applications 
require consumers' computers to work 24 by 7 in ways that can tie up 
their computing power and reduce broadband speeds for themselves 
and their neighbours‖ (id.). 
85. Id. 
86. Those services had been earlier classified by the FCC itself as 
information services, due to the fact that their ―telecommunications 
'component' … is 'functionally integrated' [with their 'computing 
functionality'] into a single 'offering'‖. Comcast, supra note 28, as 13 
(applying National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005)). In other words, those services 
were held to be not two different parts but a whole and thus not to be 
regulable as if telecommunication services, simply, they were. For 
instance, the Commission would not be able to impose a common 
carrier obligation to providers of information services – as such an 
obligation can only be imposed to services which the Commission has 
direct authority upon, which is not the case of information services. 
87. See Comcast, supra note 28, at 33-34. 
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only dial-up access providers – i.e. providers of lower 
bandwidth Internet access through telephone lines – are 
regulated as common carriers. These are fading activities of 
no greater interest to our analysis. It is with regard to 
broadcasting services that the D.C. Circuit decision matters 
to our argument. The Commission's understanding on this 
issue had been that, since the provision of online video 
service providers (e.g. by Hulu) ―has the potential to affect 
the broadcasting industry‖,88 the ways ISPs such as 
Comcast manage their networks with regard to these 
services have direct regulatory implications. Such an 
argument, though brought before the Court, had not been 
invoked originally in the Commission's Order against 
Comcast and so the D.C. Circuit declined to consider it in 
the Comcast case. The appreciation of the matter, however, 
is left open for a future opportunity and it is thus telling that 
one of the only possible grounds still available for the 
Commission to invoke its authority upon ISPs involves the 
power of edge providers themselves (e.g. Hulu) to disturb 
regulated activities at a lower layer. 
It is thus not surprising that the reciprocal 
influences between, on the one hand, the network layer, 
and, on the other hand, the applications and content layers 
were one of the foundations on which the Commission 
based its authority upon ISPs in its just recently issued 
Regulations.
89
 And yet, the Commission decided to regulate 
the contours of network management by addressing only 
one level of the equation – that of ISPs – and disregarding 
the other level – that of edge providers – tout court. In the 
Commission's words, the Rules ―apply only to the provision 
of broadband Internet access service and not to edge 
provider activities, such as the provision of content or 
applications over the Internet‖.90 Perhaps the most stringent 
reason for the Commission to decide this way was that, in 
                                                 
88. Id. at 34. 
89. See Rules, supra note 60, paras. 124 ff.. 
90. Id., para. 50. 
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its view, ISPs are ―distinguishable from other participants 
in the Internet market-place‖91 in that they ―control access 
to the Internet for their subscribers and for anyone wishing 
to reach those subscribers‖ and thus are ―capable of 
blocking, degrading, or favoring any Internet traffic that 
flows to or from a particular subscriber‖.92 But is that 
something that can only be said of ISPs? Can't we say the 
same of Google? 
 
B. THE CLICK-AWAY DELUSION 
 
The problems described above concern the digital arm 
wrestling between ISPs and edge providers. Edge 
providers, however, command the flow of communications 
on the Internet much beyond their influence over ISPs. It is 
important to understand how these actors gatekeep the 
information environment in ways that disprove the common 
assumption that at the content and application layers 
competition is just one click away. That being so, these 
actors consisting in such an essential part of the Internet 
infrastructure, there would be no reason to defend that ISPs 
are ―distinguishable from other participants in the Internet 
market-place‖.93 Given the scope of this article, we focus 
our argument on Google, drawing on research that 
demonstrates that network externalities surrounding 
Google's search platform restrict users' switching 
possibilities much beyond what is frequently assumed. 
In his book Information Rules, Hal R. Varian, now 
Google's Chief Economist proposed: "we'll show you how 
to use lock-in to your advantage, or at least to neutralize 
others who try to use it against you".
94
 Nothing more 
natural, hence, than his own company becoming a master of 
                                                 
91. Id. at 31 n.160. 
92. Id., para. 50. 
93. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
94. HAL R. VARIAN & CARL SHAPIRO, INFORMATION RULES: A 
STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 104 (1999). 
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such strategies. And even if lock-in has not been used by 
Google as a deliberate strategy, it is clear that a situation of 
lock-in has arisen in relation to Google's dominant position 
in the information environment. 
It may be difficult to define precisely what Google's 
relevant market is – that is, in which respect Google is a 
dominant actor. Search is as ubiquitous a need in the 
information environment as it is in life in general. The 
search for valuable options is intrinsically connected with 
personal autonomy, for only those options which are 
somehow found enable one to author one's life. Google's 
dominance happens with regard to reasons, informational 
options of so many different sorts that it transcends any 
single economic realm. One may argue that what 
characterizes Google's dominant position is the tendency 
towards a monopoly of meaning in the information age – a 
semiotic monopoly. Of course, Google does not in fact 
monopolize all sources of meaning of our time. But it may 
be the agent that comes closest of doing so. 
As Google dominance unfolds even further, there 
will be the need for regulators to intervene. Competition 
law, however, would face difficulties in finding the right 
reason for so. The strongest difficulty, perhaps, would be to 
ascertain the defining characteristics of informational goods 
and services. In a society in which the basic economic good 
– information – has blurred the boundaries between all 
realms of life, competition law struggles to disentangle 
markets and, most importantly, to do so amidst the different 
degrees of depth of informational processes. It is important 
to understand this question of depth for it is at the root of 
the regulatory problem we are trying to solve. Let us here 
think of information in terms of a deep structure and of a 
surface structure.
95
 
 
                                                 
95. I use the expressions differently from NOAM CHOMSKY in his 
ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX 64 ff. (1965). 
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Deeper in the structure of information we find meaning. By 
ourselves or through our technological extensions we 
interpret information in ways that convey meaning. Some 
of these meanings will relate to the functions that 
information itself performs. It is here that information is an 
adventure game, that it is Windows or Linux, a novel or a 
viral Youtube video. We may look at information and find 
reflected in it some goods that competition law has 
traditionally dealt with. Information in this sense can be 
labeled, divided into categories, some of which will matter 
for competition law. But on the face of it, on its epithelial 
surface, information is just information – and yet an 
economic good in itself. It circulates economically. We 
trade it. We access it. But as we interpret it, as we decode it 
we travel towards deeper realms in which information 
conveys ever broader forms of meaning. Information is thus 
always in both these dimensions; it is both shallow and 
deep and the challenge of competition law is to ascertain at 
what level, at which of those dimensions to pursue the 
traditional categories of economic markets – or, perhaps, to 
recognize that the regulatory enterprise actually moves us 
towards broader problems that transcend those traditional 
categories altogether. 
The perhaps hopeless struggle to find the 
boundaries between, on the one hand, information on its 
face and, on the other hand, the deeper meanings 
information conveys can be imperfectly summarized in 
McLuhan's famous expression that the medium is the 
message. Imperfectly because information itself is now 
medium and message. Gatekeepers no longer control 
merely something we can identify as Television or the 
Cinema. They control informational "equivalents‖ of these. 
They control access to information on its face and to the 
inner dimensions of information by controlling processes 
which are themselves informational. 
And, very significantly, as these actors hold and 
impart information they add new information – in surface 
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and meaning – to existing information. Even ISPs do so, for 
more that Google would wish them to inhabit only the 
surface structure of informational processes, dealing with 
meaning to no extent. 
One may thus say that no single agent in the 
information environment would meet Jean-Baptiste Say's 
classical definition of the merchant as one who "giv[es] 
value to things to which [he] actually communicate[s] no 
new quality, but that of approximation to the consumer‖96 – 
if any economic agent ever has met such a definition. 
Agents in the information environment do communicate 
new qualities to informational goods, even if for enabling 
the process of approximation Say refers to. ISPs, for 
instance, will verify if packets of data meet some core 
standards of network security. And, want it or not, as noted 
above, ISPs will also make some judgments of politics and 
morality that are inherent not only to such security checks 
(e.g. in the case of badware) but also to decisions on the 
legality of actions ISPs undertake in routing content 
through the net. ―What are the boundaries of an 
injunction?‖ ―Which authorities can prevent me from 
routing content?‖ ―Is this information related to 
paedophilia?‖ ―To terrorism?‖ "Is it fair to slow down 
pornographic material during peak hours?" "Would I need 
to have included a clause in this regard in my Terms of 
Service?" – these are all legitimate questions that may 
present themselves to an ISP. Hard cases, zones of 
penumbra inevitably call for interpretation and in doing so, 
in clearing packets before routing them, ISPs signal that 
these packets meet the criteria for being routed. Further 
value, further meaning is thus given to these packets. 
The information environment, in effect, has no 
single agent working only at the surface structure of 
informational processes – not even ISPs. Actors situated at 
one informational level are situated at other levels as well. 
                                                 
96. JEAN-BAPTISTE SAY, A TREATISE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY, 
Book I, Chapter II, para. 19 (Charles Robert Prinsep transl., 1855). 
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As much as the deep structure of information will 
relate to ISPs activities so will the surface structure be very 
important for the regulation of search. So important that it 
should actually be the starting point of regulatory activities. 
This may seem counterfactual.  Search seems to be 
virtually all about meaning. Page Ranks rely on 
outstandingly complex processes to classify and define the 
priority of information. Google's products only exist in 
what they mean to us. Looked at at their very surface, 
Google Maps, Google Books are nothing but packets of 
data somewhere in the cloud. It is only because, through 
our computers and by ourselves, we interpret what 
information means that we can think of them in terms we 
are familiar with – as Maps, as Books. The natural, it 
seems, would be for competition law to regulate Google's 
activities by looking only into the deep structure where 
these processes are. 
But when one looks at these processes in separation, 
through their different meanings, there seems to be no need 
to regulate Google's activities. Google Maps, Google Books 
are just isolated drops in the virtual seas of the information 
environment. They may seem to correspond, and in a way 
they do, to entirely different economic realms that 
regulators cannot systematically connect. Problems of 
horizontal concentration, in this sense, would be out of 
question given the apparent distance between markets in 
which Google's products are situated.
97
 And yet, the 
                                                 
97. As the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission note in their Horizontal Merger Guidelines, even if 
competition agencies' analyses need not start with the definition of 
markets, ―evaluation of competitive alternatives available to customers 
[– that is, of markets –] is always necessary at some point in the 
analysis‖. U.S. Dep‘t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm‘n, Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines (2010) [hereinafter Guidelines], at 7, available at 
http://goo.gl/quUHO. The scholarly literature has also noted the 
insufficiency of market definition exercises with regard to 
informational goods. Gilbert and Rubinfeld, for instance, argue that 
technologies are often complementary to each other and thus that it is 
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growing extent of Google's dominance in the information 
environment signals that there is something above and 
beyond such products whose economic contours we cannot 
systematically define. 
One way of responding to that is by noting that 
Google's products seem to combine into something 
fundamentally different that we call ―Search‖. But what is 
search if not something that has been offered by everyone, 
from the Church to libraries, throughout the centuries – the 
brokering of access to relevant information? Do not all 
Internet gatekeepers act as search engines – even when they 
also offer something else? While some provide purely 
logical forms of search (e.g. Wikipedia, Google Video, 
Hulu, Spotify), others connect information with the 
physical avenues where information materializes (which is 
                                                                                                 
inadequate to define technology markets as those involving 
―technologies or goods that are close enough substitutes to constrain the 
exercise of market power with respect to the intellectual property that is 
licensed‖. Such definition can be found in U.S. Dep‘t of Justice & Fed. 
Trade Comm‘n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property (1995), § 3.2.2, available at http://goo.gl/1L4Ss. See Richard 
Gilbert & Daniel Rubinfeld, Revising the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines: Lessons from the U.S. And the E.U., in COMPETITION 
POLICY AND REGULATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA, EUROPE 
AND THE US 262, 269 (Michael Faure and Xinzhu Zhang eds., 2011). 
The problem here would be to assume that there is even some degree of 
complementarity between Google's different services. That would lead 
to an overly elastic definition of markets that could very well 
encompass the whole web. On the other hand, adopting other starting 
points but the definition of markets may not be of much help to 
competition authorities either. Here, rather than looking into pricing 
dynamics within a defined market, what agencies will pursue are 
evidences of detrimental competitive effects of a merger (Guidelines, 
id.). These effects typically arise wherever reduced product quality, 
reduced product variety, reduced service, or diminished innovation (id. 
at 1) are not followed by significant pressures of demand 
substitutability. None of these effects take place in Google's increasing 
dominance scenario – rather the opposite. Google passes all these tests 
with flying colours. The problems it prompts are of a completely 
different nature. They are externalities to the Pareto efficiencies and 
Nash equilibriums of economic analysis. 
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what ISPs do)
98
. All of these – ISPs, search engines ―sensu 
stricto‖, application providers, ―content‖ providers – offer 
us gateways to information that exists both in its surface 
and at the depths of its meanings. All of them make 
judgements of relevance and otherwise, in Say's words, 
―communicate new qualities‖99 to the information-things 
they approximate consumers to. 
It is not search, as a particular service, that 
characterizes the form of dominance that Google, through 
its different activities, exerts in the information age. 
Difficult though it may be to define that dominance, 
however, one cannot deny the extent of Google's power 
over the flow of information in the information 
environment. It is perhaps to the quantitative extent of 
Google's dominance at the surface structure that we should 
look in the first place as an indication of the power of its 
qualitative decisions to influence the construction of 
meaning in our societies. 
The clear tendency of such a process of dominance 
to continue to unfold invites the placement of checks and 
balances by regulatory authorities. Of course, these checks 
and balances must come at the level of meaning. They must 
address the lock-in effects that make switching from 
Google services so costly to consumers, and this is not 
something merely related to the topology of information 
flows. 
                                                 
98. One can find another example of this logical-cum-
geographical type of services in the Domain Names System of the 
Internet, which maps mnemonically accessible names to logical 
locations associated to physcally situated resources.  IETF's RFC 1034 
speaks of a name space in a logical sense but, ultimately, these logical 
entities that we call names identify resources. Thus, ―[t]he primary goal 
[of the Domain Name System] is a consistent name space which will be 
used for referring to resources‖. Paul Mockapetris, Domain Names – 
Concepts and Facilities, IETF, RFC 1034 (Nov., 1997) para. 2.2., 
http://goo.gl/BFppN. 
99. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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Interestingly, from a regulatory standpoint, there 
may be no typical anticompetitive practice that Google is 
engaging in. And yet, the continuous densification of the 
surface structure of informational processes around 
Google's nodes on the Internet tells us that Google became 
a not always bright sun around which everything, 
irresistibly, swirls. 
Some of Google's products grant it, visibly, powers 
very similar to those held by ISPs. They create a general 
purpose infrastructure to which applications connect – or 
from which applications can be banned. This challenges 
FCC's understanding, seen above, that what distinguishes 
ISPs from other economic agents on the Internet is that 
these ―control access to the Internet for their subscribers 
and for anyone wishing to reach those subscribers‖ and thus 
are ―capable of blocking, degrading, or favoring any 
Internet traffic that flows to or from a particular 
subscriber‖.100 Android, Google's operating system for 
mobile devices, is one such example of a product that holds 
such a power, in a market that does not count on wide 
competition and in which competitors, like Apple iPad's 
iOS, do not have a very impressive track record of 
openness. Not only can Android block certain applications 
if so it wishes, it can have Google favour it through its 
other product offerings, furthering the ongoing process of 
lock-in. Microsoft has argued just so in a complaint 
recently filed before the European Commission in which it 
submits, inter alia, that Android, which is the dominant OS 
for mobiles, is being favoured by Youtube, a Google-
owned company.
101
 
                                                 
100. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
101. Brad Smith, Microsoft Corporation, Adding our Voice to 
Concerns about Search in Europe (Mar. 30, 2011, 09:00 PM), 
MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES: NEWS AND PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL, 
PUBLIC POLICY AND CITIZENSHIP TOPICS, http://goo.gl/NGB0a 
(―Unfortunately, Google has refused to allow Microsoft‘s new 
Windows Phones to access this YouTube metadata in the same way that 
Android phones and iPhones do‖). 
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Less visible, but way more significant, is the 
process of lock-in that Google has been able to carry 
forward with its search engine. Against the common 
assumption that users can easily shift to competitors such as 
Bing or Yahoo should Google abuse its dominant position, 
research has shown that Google's market displays low 
contestability.
102
 In Argenton's and Prüfer's words, "the 
production of search quality is characterized by a peculiar 
(intertemporal) kind of indirect network externalities".
103
 
The quality of search is said to be a network externality 
because it results from the use of search engines by a 
network of consumers – the larger the network, the greater 
the quality and thus the value that the search engine, as a 
product, will acquire. As no search engine has accumulated 
the wealth of knowledge that Google has about users' 
clicking behaviour, no other search engine can offer the 
same experience in terms of accuracy that Google can. 
Argenton and Prüfer also believe the market of 
search has reached a tipping point, promising to become 
ever more concentrated, monopolistic indeed, unless 
regulators intervene.
104
 Such an increasing concentration, 
they demonstrate, has been taking place since 2003, 
evidencing that the market's tipping point had already been 
reached by then and pointing to a strong tendency towards 
monopolization. The solution, in the authors' view, would 
be an obligation for Google to share with its competitors 
the data related to users' clicking behaviour. In their words, 
                                                 
102. See Rufus Pollock, Is Google the Next Microsoft: 
Competition, Welfare and Regulation in Online Search, 9:4 REVIEW OF 
NETWORK ECONOMICS Article 4 (2010), noting that a ―strong 
contestability result ... is unlikely to be robust [in the search market]‖ 
(at 18). See Cédric Argenton & Jens Prüfer, Search Engine Competition 
with Network Externalities, TILEC DISCUSSION PAPER, DP 2011-024 
(2011), available at http://goo.gl/MSlWv, arguing that ―the search 
engine market displays a strong structural tendency towards 
monopolization‖ (at 1-2). 
103. Argenton and Prüfer, id. at 2. 
104. Id. at 9. 
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"intense competition between search engines based alone 
on the merits of the search algorithm provides better 
incentives to the firms to produce high quality products 
than the rent enjoyed by a dominant firm that exploits a 
competitive advantage created by network externalities".
105
 
Rufus Pollock also reaches the conclusion that, in 
theory, in a fixed zero-price scenario customers ―will only 
use the search engine(s) with the maximum quality‖106 – a 
scenario of winner-takes-all competition. In practice, with 
regard to search, Pollock believes that it is likely that there 
will be some heterogeneity in the perception of quality – 
e.g. through brand preference, or specialization in a certain 
type of content (e.g. Baidu for MP3-related search). The 
situation is thus unlikely to be so stark as to lead to a 
monopoly, but still tends to lead to a firm being highly 
dominant in the search market. Heterogeneity in brand 
perception will also explain why certain search engines 
have a higher market share in certain markets than in others 
despite differences in quality – e.g. Yahoo's substantially 
low market share in the UK and Google's vis-à-vis Baidu's 
in China.
107
 
On the other hand, however, and more importantly, 
brand perception also contributes to reinforce the adoption 
of the dominant search engine in the market and reduces 
the contestability of its market-share – in what it is joined 
by the adoption of search engine specific query strategies 
by users, personalization of search results and,
108
 I would 
add, users' familiarity with a given search engine 
interface.
109
 These are all factors that contribute to the non-
negligible lock-in of users in the search market. Together 
with the very high up-front, fixed costs for challengers to 
                                                 
105. Id. at 15. 
106. Pollock, supra note 102, at 12. 
107. Id. at 16-18. 
108. Id. 
109. See Argenton & Prüfer, supra note 102, at 7 (citing a survey 
showing that interface design plays a role in product differentiation of 
search engines). 
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invest in R&D and infrastructure
110
 – costs which can 
always be topped up by Google – those factors lead to the 
continuous strengthening of Google's dominance in the 
search market. For reasons that Pollock explains well, the 
establishment of a monopoly tends towards – even 
purposefully – reduction of quality.111 
The modality of regulatory intervention suggested 
by Pollock would be the decoupling of ―software‖ (e.g. the 
ranking algorithms) and ―service‖ (the facilities such as 
data-centres, support systems etc., which run the 
―software‖). For him, decoupling the two would allow for 
greater competition, inclusively by fostering greater 
transparency on the software side. Regulation would 
happen over the service side, which would be provided 
through governmental intervention, in a monopoly or near-
monopoly scheme, allowing companies to concentrate their 
investments on the software side.
112
 
While Pollock's suggestion is interesting, it does not 
directly answer Argenton and Prüfer's concern with regard 
to monopoly on the information resulting from users' 
clicking behaviour. From a competition standpoint, lack of 
transparency seems to be much more a concern in that 
regard than with regard to ranking algorithms themselves. 
The transparency of ranking algorithms should be fostered 
not because of competition reasons – actually there is 
nothing harmful in secrecy in this regard. 
Rather, criteria embedded in algorithms should be 
made available, at least to regulatory authorities, for more 
general public accountability reasons. After all, in 
determining which reasons to make available for their 
users, search engines will inevitably be guided by 
evaluative considerations of moral and political nature 
whose impact can be as far reaching in the public sphere as 
moral and political choices made by ISPs can be. If 
                                                 
110. Pollock, supra note 102, at 11. 
111. Id. at 21-23. 
112. Id. at 26-27. 
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transparency is demanded from ISPs, there is no reason 
why the same standards should not be extended to search 
engines. 
This demand for transparency does not seem to sit 
comfortably in Pollock's model. His proposals of regulatory 
intervention mostly concern the ―service‖ component of 
search.
113
 It seems that, in Pollock's view, transparency of 
the algorithms would arise as a natural outcome of 
regulatory decoupling rather than by regulatory fiat. At 
some point in his text, though, he does incidentally remark 
that regulators could handle distortions by requesting 
confidential access to the algorithms and functioning as a 
review panel for ranking 'appeals'.
114
 Pollock does not, 
however, advance a proposal similar to that by Argenton 
and Prüfer, which seems a much more likely candidate to 
address his competition concerns. Ironically, though, 
Pollock's incidental suggestions with regard to search 
algorithms seem to transcend pure competition matters and 
provide us with a viable solution to the problem of public 
accountability of dominant search engines. 
But are these proposals enough to regulate Google's 
increasing dominance in the information environment? 
They concern only the problem of search engines ―sensu 
stricto‖ – not Google's wider influence over the flow of 
information in what above we have called the surface 
structure of the information environment. In its recent 
complaint before the European Commission, Microsoft 
noted that Google's dominance in the search market is 
strengthened by Google's having exclusive deals with most 
website owners to display its search box with exclusivity 
for search by the users of these websites. It is true that 
Google's widespread search boxes further the process of 
lock-in.
115
 They are, however, only a limited, visible part of 
                                                 
113. Id. at 26 (―[R]egulatory attention could be focused on the 
'service' side which in many ways is simpler‖). 
114. Id. at 27. 
115. See Smith, supra note 101. 
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a much larger problem. The problem of Google's 
dominance extends far beyond what we understand by its 
―search engine‖. Through the provision of services in the 
most diversified, even disconnected areas – ranging from 
Maps to Books, from News to Translation, from Videos to 
Shopping Tools, Blogs and Operating Systems, Google is 
increasingly everywhere information is. 
One can see in Google's strategies plenty of the 
insights Hal Varian outlines in his work with regard to the 
recognition of lock-in effects. We know that, with regard to 
mass-market products, especially those characterized by 
zero-price models, ―small consumer switching costs can 
constitute large barriers to entry‖.116 We know that 
―[c]ustomer perceptions are paramount‖ and then that ―a 
brand premium based on superior reputation or advertising 
is just as valuable as an equal premium based on truly 
superior quality‖.117 We also know that ―one of the 
distinctive features of information-based lock-in is that it 
tends to be so durable: equipment wears out, reducing 
switching costs, but specialized databases live on and grow, 
enhancing lock-in over time‖.118 Or that ―with brand-
specific training, switching costs tend to rise with time, as 
personnel become more and more familiar with the existing 
system‖;119 that ―[s]earch costs borne by consumers when 
switching brands include the psychological costs of 
changing ingrained habits‖.120 Or, finally, that ―[t]he easiest 
place to hop onto the lock-in cycle is at the brand selection 
point – that is, when the customer chooses a new brand‖121 
– a brand with which she will be locked-in after an 
entrenchment phase, ―when consumer really gets used to 
the new brand [and] develops a preference for that brand 
                                                 
116. Varian & Shapiro, supra note 94, at 109. 
117. Id. at 113-114. 
118. Id. at 115. 
119. Id. at 121. 
120. Id. at 126. 
121. Id. at 131. 
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over others‖.122 Paradoxical as it may seem, in zero-price 
markets all these effects are maximized. 
It may, however, be unfair to characterize Google's 
profiting from these postulates as purely a deliberate plan to 
dominate the information environment. Of course, Google's 
practices come in a context. Altogether, they must be seen 
as intrinsic components of Google's overall political 
agenda. But, taken for their own, individualized properties, 
those strategies aren't simply ill intentioned attempts of 
domination. They are also characteristic traits of 
informational markets. That Google masters their 
knowledge so well is not just the result of some degree of 
malignity but also a demonstration of competence in 
understanding the social dynamics of our time. Hence, it 
would be odd to claim that simply because Google engages 
in those practices it is resorting to specific forms of anti-
competitive behaviour. 
This is not to say those practices should not be 
regulated. All that is meant here is that the justifications for 
regulatory intervention should move beyond the culpability 
of Google's individualized modes of conduct from a 
competition standpoint. Regulators must understand that 
Google's gigantic and ever-increasing influence over the 
surface structure of the information environment in effect 
sublimes the traditional categories of competition law and 
provides a distinctive justification for state action. It is thus 
fundamental to objectively measure the reach of this 
influence. Webometrics-like tools may be an important 
regulatory aid here.
123
 They may help us to visualize the 
extent to which Google enframes the information 
environment and, by doing so, controls the construction of 
meaning in the most different realms of life in society. 
                                                 
122. Id. at 132. 
123. See, e.g., Michael Thelwall, Introduction to Webometrics: 
Quantitative Web Research for the Social Sciences, 1:1 SYNTHESIS 
LECTURES ON INFORMATION CONCEPTS, RETRIEVAL, AND SERVICES 1 
(2009). 
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And yet, because we are dealing with informational 
goods, our task as regulators cannot be purely objective. 
While the starting point of measuring the dynamics of 
information flows needs indeed to rely on objective 
parameters, the inherent subjectivity – the deep structure – 
of informational goods cannot be overlooked. It is actually 
this subjectivity that, by dissolving the boundaries between 
Google's activities, makes the reach of these so 
problematic. 
The proposals by Argenton and Prüfer and by 
Pollock walk some way towards an objective direction. 
They take lock-in as a fact of life, rather than as a form of 
anti-competitive behaviour tout court, and they consider 
which policies can mitigate lock-in effects. But those 
authors seem still to rely on the idea of search as a relevant 
market and on the need to address lock-in effects related to 
search engines as a product. The objectivity of their 
proposals is thus limited by the ignored subjectivity of the 
object they focus on. 
To think of search merely as a product to be regulated by 
disentangling its different components is a partial, still 
competition-based effort that does not factor in the 
polysemic nature of information – the capacity of 
information to convey the different meanings which and 
through which we are always searching for, be it by 
'googling', clicking, dialling, twitting, opening, tapping, 
flipping and overall seeking to access. To search for 
information can thus mean as many things as the 
information we seek to access, the means we use for so and 
the ways we interpret such information ourselves or 
through our technological extensions. 
What we now call search is but a topical, contingent 
form of procuring access. 
Of course, regulators must also be attentive to the 
different, contextual meanings of search; to the different 
forms through which search is carried out. Regulating these 
may mean to enact more granular, technology-specific rules 
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– rules attentive to particular dimensions of social 
conventions surrounding technological artefacts. Above and 
beyond these fragmented dimensions, however, we must 
understand search as a foundational component of agency 
in the information environment – this space-time 
continuum that, today and for the foreseeable future, curves 
around Google's gravity. 
We as regulators must understand that the 
dangerous monopoly that Google's activities tend towards 
is the monopoly of meaning itself – even if such is a 
tendency that will never be fully realized. In the end, there 
is no simple problem of competition here but a race to 
control the flow of information in a plethora of different 
possibilities. That is why we find Google interested in 
―competing‖ with ISPs, Cable TVs, Operating System 
developers, Encyclopaedias, Bookstores amongst many 
others. And that is why we find Google attempting to 
neutralize actors that in any way can threaten its 
overarching project of ―organizing all the world's 
information‖. Such is indeed a project that, by its very 
nature, admits of no alterity. 
 
 
IV. NEUTRALITY, AUTONOMY, AND THE INFORMATION 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
In March 2010, when Google decided to pull its search 
engine away from Mainland China, the New York Times 
ran an article noting Google's state-like foreign policy 
attitude. The article quoted the following statement by New 
York University Professor Clay Shirky: ‖[w]hat forces 
Google to have a foreign policy is that what they‘re 
exporting isn‘t a product or a service, it‘s a freedom‖.124 
Shirky's statement in a way concurs with what has been 
said in our preceding section. As we have seen, the 
                                                 
124. Mark Landler, Google Searches for a Foreign Policy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, at WK4, available at http://goo.gl/y6u68. 
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justifications for intervening on Google's activities are not 
purely economic. Regulation should ensue not merely 
because of competition aspects related to a product or a 
service. Rather, the problem is cognitive and evaluative in a 
broader sense. Regulation should ensue because of the 
tendency that Google, by controlling the structure of the 
information environment, will also control the construction 
of meaning and value in contemporary societies. Our 
concurrence with Shirky can thus only be partial. For it is 
not freedom what is exported by Google, but rather the lack 
thereof – a diminishing of our possibilities of living 
autonomous lives. And, as Yochai Benkler explains in his 
chef-d'oeuvre, The Wealth of Networks, ―a concern with 
autonomy provides a distinct justification for the policy 
concern with media concentration‖ that move us beyond 
considering the limits of competitive markets.
125
 
From all we have seen in the lines above it should 
be clear that this article's concern with autonomy develops 
in two fronts. On the one hand, it relates to Google's 
attempt of, by influencing the development of law and 
policy, neutralizing other agents who threaten its overall 
project of ―organizing‖ the information environment. This 
was our focus in Part II, in which we looked in particular 
into the case of Internet Service Providers. On the other 
hand, our concern relates to Google's possibilities of 
increasingly controlling the global flow of information 
through the lock-in effects of its own services. This was our 
focus in Part III.  From the perspective of the economic 
agents that Google seeks to neutralize, it is beyond doubt 
that to have one's possibilities of choosing amongst 
available options neutralized – which the idea of network 
neutrality, in any of its flavours, imposes to ISPs – goes 
against freedom of enterprise and the foundations of any 
liberal model one can conceive of. With regard to the 
relationships between users and Google, however, the 
question is more nuanced. 
                                                 
125. Benkler, supra note 20, at 157. 
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Here one could argue that, by providing services 
that further number and diversity of options available to us, 
Google actually enhances our autonomy. This is the view 
held by Yochai Benkler, which merits our careful 
examination as we close our venture in this paper. 
Benkler's body of work is undoubtedly the most 
sophisticated and profound thought-exercise on the political 
theory of the information environment. There is much we 
can learn from it but I will focus our discussions in this 
section on a single, overarching point, which is Benkler's 
understanding of what an ideal conception of the political 
system would look like if we are to further personal 
autonomy in the information environment. Understanding 
how the idea of neutrality can fit into such a conception – 
or why it cannot – is fundamental if we are to situate 
Google's prescriptions against the backdrop of a more 
refined account of the relations between state and society in 
the information age. Benkler's ideas shed important lights 
here. Though there is much to compliment Benkler for on 
his understanding of personal autonomy, I trust that, more 
broadly, there are also some acute shortcomings in his 
views of what a political system consists in, as well as 
some important lessons to be learned from these. Let us 
pursue the point further. 
We should start by noting the prominence that 
filtering mechanisms rightly assume in Benkler's 
framework. According to Benkler, the decentralization and 
socialization
126
 of earlier creative industries has caused an 
overload of information that threatens our prospects of self-
                                                 
126. In The Wealth of Networks and in earlier works, Benkler 
speaks of a new model of commons-based peer production or, more 
broadly, of social production, as a social-economic phenomenon that 
provides a third-way alternative to the traditional models of markets 
and firms – an alternative of systematic advantages for dealing with 
information and culture as objects of production. See, in particular, 
Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the 
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002). 
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authorship in the information environment.
127
 Lost amidst 
so much, we need Google and (if there were) its like to 
redeem us from a life of ignorance in plenitude. The so-
called Babel objection to the idea that social production 
furthers autonomy poses, in effect, that the cacophony of 
new forms of production undermines our capacity of 
identifying those options that are available to us. Benkler's 
response is, in part, that filtering mechanisms like Google 
rescue us from our wandering around through the busy 
avenues of the information environment.
128
 
The problem here, however, is the illusion that 
entrusting to a company the design of our possibilities of 
action in the information environment furthers our personal 
autonomy. In reality, the choices made by Google are 
constitutive of our personal autonomy – they are to a large 
extent what our autonomy amounts to or, precisely because 
of this, what our autonomy does not amount to at all. In 
other words, our normative sources here do not come from 
within, but rather from outside of us. The process is not one 
of autonomy, but of heteronomy
129
 and, to the extent that a 
dominant entity seeks to ―organize‖ all sources of 
normativity in the information environment, it is also a 
process of neutralization of other sources of normativity – 
of neutralization of alterity – in this same environment. 
To be fair, there is a sense in which Benkler sees a 
role for the state in laying down the structural foundations 
that will enable personal autonomy to flourish in the 
information environment. But Benkler is also largely 
optimistic about the possibilities that these foundations will 
arise organically, from within the information environment 
itself. The role that he sees for the state is thus, 
correspondingly, a reduced role. It is with regard to this 
somewhat reductionist perspective, which I will note as a 
                                                 
127. Benkler, supra note 20, at 169 ff. 
128. Id. 
129. See supra p. 10. 
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shortcoming of his theory, that Benkler's work invites our 
attention. 
Benkler indeed seems to assume that a liberal model 
for our age demands a dissociation between the state and 
the substance of life plans chosen by individuals in the 
information environment. In assuming so, as I will discuss 
below, Benkler departs from the particular liberal model 
that, in his book and elsewhere, he claims to embrace – the 
model put forward by Joseph Raz, inter alia in his The 
Morality of Freedom.
130
 It is unclear why Benkler departs 
from Raz so silently. Perhaps, though this is unlikely, he 
does so unconsciously. Perhaps he does so to render his 
theory more palatable to an audience traditionally resistant 
to the idea that the state may nose into the information 
environment beyond just supporting its development.
131 
Whatever the reason, however, Benkler's departure from 
Raz is difficult to defend. Understanding how such a 
departure unfolds will allow us to reach important 
conclusions about the regulation of the information 
environment and of search as a foundational component of 
it. 
                                                 
130. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). In one of 
his earlier articles, whose ideas are echoed in his book, Benkler draws 
more heavily and explicitly on Raz's work. See Yochai Benkler, Siren 
Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (2001). 
131. That being so, Langdon Winner's words could not happen to 
be more opportune. Speaking of those who seek to advocate a broader 
normative agenda in a world dominated by anti-normative, efficiency-
oriented stances, Winner notes: ―Because the idea of efficiency attracts 
a wide consensus, it is sometimes used as a conceptual Trojan horse by 
those who have more challenging political agendas they hope to 
smuggle in. But victories won in this way are in other respects great 
losses. For they affirm in our words and in our methodologies that there 
are certain human ends that no longer dare to be spoken in public. 
Lingering in that stuffy Trojan horse too long, even soldiers of virtue 
eventually suffocate‖. LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE 
REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 54 
(1986). 
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On the one hand, and as we have just noted, Benkler 
does believe that state intervention is necessary to ensure 
the structural possibilities that enable personal autonomy to 
be furthered in the information environment. For him, we 
need to care for the effects that ―law can have through the 
way it structures the relationships among people with 
regard to the information environment they occupy‖.132 
This is so as the structure of the information environment 
will itself enable or disable different configurations in 
social relationships. How more or less autonomous one will 
be within these relationships is tantamount to how the 
structure of the information environment is designed. In 
Benkler's words, ―[t]he structure of our information 
environment is constitutive of our autonomy, not only 
functionally significant to it‖.133 The state thus has a role in 
ensuring these structural foundations of personal autonomy. 
On the other hand, precisely because in the 
information environment determining structure goes 
beyond form and transmutes into substance,
134
 there is a 
delicate balance to be struck here. Benkler trusts that the 
empowerment of individuals – rather than the political 
system – to jointly and directly devise the structural 
contours of their environment is to be welcomed as the 
default option. 
―[F]iltration and accreditation‖ tools are an 
important example, as a fundamental part of that structure. 
Due to their being ―themselves information goods‖,135 and 
thus as much substance as they are form, such tools can be 
devised through the same peer-production, social processes 
that Benkler sees as characterizing the production of 
knowledge in contemporary societies. Of course, to some 
extent the design of such tools will be reflective of 
boundaries outlined by the state. For Benkler, the setting of 
                                                 
132. Benkler, supra note 20, at 151. 
133. Id. at 146. 
134. We have discussed this point in Part III supra. 
135. Benkler, supra note 20, at 169. 
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structural boundaries is necessary not as part of any 
program of positive liberty but as a condition of self-
authorship in itself.
136
 To a larger extent, however, the 
development of filtering and accreditation tools will mostly 
unfold as both an enabler and a produce of people's 
autonomous pursuit of their own walks of life. In fact, 
Benkler trusts this is the way things are happening right 
now. In his words, 
―From the discussions of Wikipedia to the 
moderation and metamoderation scheme of 
Slashdot, and from the sixty thousand volunteers 
that make up the Open Directory Project to the 
PageRank system used by Google, the means of 
filtering data are being produced within the 
networked information economy using peer 
production and the coordinate patterns of 
nonproprietary production more generally‖.137 
It seems far-fetched, however – and it was so already in 
2005, when his book was written – to include Google and 
the Wikipedia in the same group of socially produced 
filtering tools. Benkler seems to be widely carried by 
Google's rhetoric about the democratic properties of its 
search engine. This affinity with Google also appears very 
clearly in the antipathy reserved by the author towards the 
ways in which, according to him, the adoption of ―policy 
routers‖ by Internet Service Providers138 threatens to reduce 
                                                 
136. Id. at 141. 
137. Id. at 171-172. 
138. ―It is fairly clear that the new router increases the capacity of 
cable operators to treat their subscribers as objects, and to manipulate 
their actions in order to make them act as the provider wills, rather than 
as they would have had they had perfect information‖ (id. at 148). This 
is not completely surprising, though, since much of Benkler's earlier 
scholarship had been directed to advocating commons-based forms of 
administration of communications resources. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, 
Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally 
Networked Environment, 11 HARVARD  J.L. &  TECH. 287 (1998), a 
view, of course, which he continues to sustain in the book. See, e.g., 
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individual autonomy. Why doesn't Benkler direct 
equivalent suspicions to that which is by far the hegemonic 
power in the information environment – Google? Most 
interestingly, while for the generality of gatekeepers the 
accumulation of power seems to be a concern in itself,
139
 
with regard to search engines, for Benkler, only monopoly 
and the masking of paid rankings seem to be so.
140
 
As noted above, Benkler's liberal theory for the 
information environment draws widely on Joseph Raz's 
work. But it is from Benkler's peculiar departure from Raz 
that we can extract the most interesting lessons for our 
debates in this article. These lessons concern the interplay 
between the ideas of autonomy and neutrality. 
It appears that, by criticizing ISPs' policy-based 
routing of data, Benkler is defending theories of network 
neutrality. Neutrality, however, is not something we can 
reconcile with liberal theory of a Razian orientation – if yet 
we can reconcile it with with contemporary liberalism at 
all. Raz is a liberal perfectionist. To a great extent, his work 
in political theory has focused on debunking earlier theories 
of political neutrality, such as John Rawls's and Robert 
Nozick's, under the premise that a truly liberal model 
founded on autonomy and value pluralism actually needs 
the political institutions of society to engage with 
conceptions of the good life. Without political engagement 
                                                                                                 
Benkler, supra note 20, at 161 (―The autonomy deficit of private 
communications and information systems is a result of the formal 
structure of property as an institutional device and the role of 
communications and information systems as basic requirements in the 
ability of individuals to formulate purposes and plan actions to fit their 
lives‖). 
139. ―The extent to which information overload inhibits autonomy 
relative to the autonomy of an individual exposed to a well-edited 
information flow depends on how much the editor who whittles down 
the information flow thereby gains power over the life of the user of the 
editorial function, and how he or she uses that power‖ (id. at 169). 
140. ―The problem would be with search engines that mix the two 
strategies and hide the mix, or with a monopolistic search engine‖ (id. 
at 157). 
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of this kind the state cannot ensure that people will have 
available to them the means necessary for authoring 
valuable lives. As Raz puts it, 
―Political action should be concerned with 
providing individuals with the means by which they 
can develop, which enable them to choose and 
attempt to realize their own conception of the good. 
But there is nothing here which speaks for 
neutrality. For it is the goal of all political action to 
enable individuals to pursue valid conceptions of 
the good and to discourage evil or empty ones‖.141 
Benkler, on the other hand, though welcoming a 
limited structural role for the state, notes that the 
structuring of social relationships ―calls for no therapeutic 
agenda to educate adults in a wide range of options. It calls 
for no one to sit in front of educational programs‖.142 
Benkler seems to be reminding us that, precisely because 
the information environment conflates form and substance, 
the state should be mindful of its power of interfering in the 
content of people's conceptions of the good; that the state 
should embrace a posture of restraint with regard to these – 
a doctrine of political neutrality – deferring substantive 
choices to the new collaborative forces that characterize the 
information environment. 
In his view, attempts to intervene on cultural 
discourse seem to be neither justifiable nor feasible. While 
Benkler does criticize the black-box approach of certain 
liberal theories – such as Rawls's – that ignore culture as a 
legitimate concern for the political constitution of a 
society,
143
 he also cautions about the futility of attempting 
to regulate culture itself, beyond laying out the structural 
foundations upon which the cultural modes of the 
information age can thrive. We must take up a "systematic 
                                                 
141. Raz, supra note 130, at 133. 
142. Benkler, supra note 20, at 151. 
143. Id. at 279-280. 
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commitment to avoid direct intervention on cultural 
exchange".
144
 In his words,  
"Understanding that culture is a matter of political 
concern even within a liberal framework does not ... 
translate into an agenda of intervention in the 
culture sphere as an extension of legitimate decision 
making. Cultural discourse is systematically not 
amenable to formal regulation, management, or 
direction from the political system".
145
 
The theory here is that the transparency and participatory 
possibilities of 21st century liberal societies will increase 
reflexivity in cultural processes and enable people to make 
better and more autonomous decisions on how to author 
their life stories against an ever more refined cultural 
background. Fair enough and there surely are reasons to 
believe that to a great extent that will be so. But to move 
from here to the conclusion that people will wind up at such 
a liberating intellectual oasis even if left to their own 
devices by a state that has a merely structural role seems to 
be an unwarranted jump. Several challenges can be raised 
to this conclusion. 
First, research shows that cultural discourse tends 
towards polarization, where groups of individuals tend to 
get ever more extreme in their world views.
146
 Will a 
                                                 
144. Id. at 298. 
145. Id. 
146. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2007). Benkler 
rejects Sunstein's theory but does not go to great lengths to disprove it. 
See Benkler, supra note 20, at 238-239. The irony here is that the very 
visible polarization around net neutrality debates, and the twitter 
brouhahas that seem to feed these, lend remarkable persuasiveness to 
Sunstein's arguments. Further research on political polarization on 
Twitter notes that, while people do use that platform to engage with 
alternative world views, they find themselves unable to do so in a 
meaningful way – and, of course, tend to interact more with like-
minded users. Boyd and Yardi seem to blame it on the constraints of 
the platform. That may be so. But then it is worth noticing that the 
major constraint presented by Twitter is not its brevity. More space will 
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framework to sort out disagreement between groups emerge 
even if no choices are made by the political system on 
aspects of such a framework that are themselves cultural 
and substantive? 
Second, and related to this, are there frameworks 
that can evade cultural choices at all? The choice for a 
liberal framework for cultural decision making of the sort 
that Benkler envisions is already, in itself, a cultural choice 
of the kind he sets out to avoid. Different cultural traditions 
exist where possibilities of cultural dissent in the 
information environment are more tightly and substantively 
regulated – think of China. Conceptions of the state present 
themselves differently in these traditions and are reflected 
in different forms in the substance of their cultural 
discourses. The only way to live up to Benkler's aspirations 
is thus to eliminate any more ambitious image of the 
political system from the substance of cultural discourses in 
the information environment. But this, in itself, would 
amount to the elimination of dissenting voices, of 
alternative cultural conceptions within which a political 
system is formed. Culture pervades everything which is 
done in a society. To refrain from making substantive 
choices with regard to culture is to refrain from making 
substantive choices altogether. How can that be possible? 
Third, Benkler's recipe says much about the 
framework that will enable us to jointly model the outer 
boundaries of a cultural clay man, but it says nothing about 
                                                                                                 
not per se add to consent. The major constraint is another which, 
especially after their recent victories in the spring revolutions, actors in 
the West may not be willing to sacrifice: immediacy. See Danah Boyd 
& Sarita Yardi, Dynamic Debates: An Analysis of Group Polarization 
over Time on Twitter, 30(5) BULLETIN OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & 
SOCIETY 316-32 (2010). Noting, besides polarization, the frequently 
uncivil tone of the debates, see Michael Conover, Jacob Ratkiewicz, 
Matthew Francisco, Bruno Gonçalves, Alessandro Flammini & Filippo 
Menczer, Political Polarization on Twitter, Paper Presented at the Fifth 
International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (Jul. 17-
21, 2011), http://goo.gl/741x8. 
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what to do, politically, when the clay man happen to 
embody a wicked soul. There is an underlying assumption 
in Benkler's work – in which he is certainly not alone – that 
the generative possibilities of the information environment, 
the forms of participation and collaboration that 
characterize it, must be cherished as intrinsically good.
147
 
This reflects an all too common creed in the auspicious 
properties of technological development – always to be 
preferred to the intractable substantive problems of 
normativity. But what to do when the mores and sentiments 
of a time happen to be different from what reason would 
advise? 
It is known that crowds can behave badly and the 
Internet gives us uncountable examples of that. Internet 
vigilantism is one such.
148
 Aided by technological tools, 
crowds come together to hold individuals accountable 
beyond any proportionality or due process guarantees, if 
not to bully completely innocent people for the sheer fun of 
it. The Internet promises to forever 'remember' wrongdoers 
for their misdeeds and mocked individuals for their 
magnified traits.
149
 The outputs of collaborative efforts are 
themselves inherently wrong in these cases. And one 
cannot endow ordeals with virtue just by correcting their 
procedural improprieties. The political system needs to 
address the substantive cultural assumptions upon which 
such processes hinge. 
Fourth, and linked to the third, there is the challenge 
of adjudication. Who is going to settle disputes arising out 
of substantive cultural matters of the information 
environment? Benkler's only possible solution to this 
                                                 
147. Generativity is, indeed, the happiness of contemporary 
utilitarianism – or at least its idiosyncrasy. See Jonathan Zittrain, supra 
note 82, at 90. 
148. See Anne Cheung, Rethinking Public Privacy in the Internet 
Era: A Study of Virtual Persecution by the Internet Crowd, 1:2 THE 
JOURNAL OF MEDIA LAW 191 (2009). 
149. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF 
FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2009). 
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challenge is to say: information environment's very 
'inhabitants'. He cannot say so, however, without resorting 
to the same Rawlsian rights-based discourse that he himself 
vilifies. That is, the only way Benkler can hold to this claim 
is to concede that adjudication by the state should be 
limited to legally-recognized rights that are themselves of a 
different nature from that of substantive cultural affairs, 
whose disputes should be settled by society. One could 
respond to this by saying that state adjudication, while not 
concerning cultural affairs, can nonetheless concern the 
structure that brings cultural affairs about. But this does not 
solve the problem. One still needs to clarify the nature of 
structural concerns themselves – the only possibility being 
to assign these the status of rights, in distinction from 
cultural goods. 
However, if disputes concerning cultural goods are 
to be settled by society itself, who is going to mobilize the 
coercive apparatus? If these disputes – all that take place 
within the information environment – cannot mobilize the 
coercive apparatus, are we to restrict the use of coercion to 
the increasingly less frequent disputes that do not concern 
cultural matters? Furthermore, if society itself ends up 
devising alternative forms of coercion more compatible 
with cultural goods, can we still sustain the distinction 
between society and the state or, rather, Benkler's theory 
ends up engulfing itself? 
The only way to answer these questions 
satisfactorily, it seems, is to admit that there isn't, after all, 
any difference of nature between rights and other cultural 
conceptions of the good. Rights-based disputes, in effect, 
arise in profoundly cultural settings. The difference that 
exists is one of degree. Rights are forms of good whose 
violation the law recognizes as having particular 
significance, assigning them, as a result, the power to 
invoke the coercive apparatus of the state – or at least to 
claim from the state different modalities of promotion and 
incentive that are inherent to their recognition and 
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fulfilment. Normative, cultural as they are, rights exist 
within a wider practical universe. Together with other 
conceptions of the good, they form a system on whose 
contours our possibilities of living an autonomous life will 
hinge. Nothing more natural, thus, than that the state 
engages with the system as a whole. 
The idea of merely structural interventions by the 
state to further personal autonomy, though claiming to see 
what Rawls prevents us from seeing, namely culture, in 
effect resembles Robert Nozick's libertarian framework 
where the state provides people with nothing but a filter – a 
framework for reaching agreements that, politically, are 
conducive to no other political arrangement but that of a 
minimal state. Indeed, if the role of the state is to provide 
society with a framework for their own, autonomous 
cultural agreements in a world where culture is everything 
– staying away otherwise but to enforce the operation of the 
framework – the proposal is virtually identical (but in its 
claimed bounteousness) to that of Robert Nozick's 
framework for 'utopia'.
150
 
Everything could not be more incompatible with 
Joseph Raz's liberal perfectionist model, which Benkler 
claims to embrace in his work – but which in reality he 
does not. Most importantly, if Raz is correct, Benkler's 
ruling out of more ―positive‖ modalities of political action 
seems actually to be incompatible with Benkler's own 
agenda of furthering personal autonomy. For Raz, in effect, 
the substantive elimination of bad, autonomy-demeaning 
options is not incompatible with liberal pursuits – rather 
liberalism requires this.
151
 While coercion should be 
                                                 
150. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 297-333 
(1974). 
151. It requires so even at the price of coercion to prevent the 
pursuit of morally repugnant options. For Raz, ―[the] pursuit of the 
morally repugnant cannot be defended from coercive interference on 
the ground that being an autonomous choice endows it with any value‖. 
Raz, supra note 68, at 418. 
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reserved only for the morally repugnant options,
152
 
regulatory modalities that, for instance, subsidize the 
performance of valuable activities or discourage the pursuit 
of evil ones are nonetheless to be welcomed.
153
 Education 
seems to be just a perfect example of these less direct forms 
of regulatory intervention. 
The goal of liberalism, in sum, is to ensure the 
availability of valuable options for individuals and groups 
to author their lives. Modalities of state intervention that, 
by making substantive choices for the information 
environment, enhance the overall prospects that a wide 
range of options will be available for people to author their 
lives are to be preferred to the minimal and anti-idealistic 
conceptions of a state that practices a form of 
informational, cultural negligence under the flag of 
neutrality. 
Doctrines of neutrality rely on a fictitious and 
arbitrary distinction between goals that can be pursued by 
the state and those that cannot. They were characteristic of 
liberal theories of the industrial age – such as Rawls's, with 
which Benkler, in the end, has a somewhat uneasy 
relationship.
154
 Such theories sustained the vision that the 
                                                 
152. ―Perfectionist goals need not be pursued by the use of 
coercion. A government which subsidizes certain activities, rewards 
their pursuit, and advertises their availability encourages those activities 
without using coercion. ... The government has an obligation to create 
an environment providing individuals with an adequate range of options 
and the opportunities to choose them. ... Autonomy-based duties ... 
require the use of public power to promote the conditions of autonomy, 
to secure an adequate range of options for their population" (id. at 417-
418). 
153. ―[T]the autonomy principle is a perfectionist principle. 
Autonomous life is valuable only if it is spent in the pursuit of 
acceptable and valuable projects and relationships. The autonomy 
principle permits and even requires governments to create morally 
valuable opportunities, and to eliminate repugnant ones‖ (id. at 417). 
154. Benkler does seem to have an uneasy relationship with Rawls. 
On the one hand, he criticizes Rawls's black-box approach with regard 
to culture. On the other hand, he does not seem to fully reject the 
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state must assign a lexical priority to individualistic forms 
of good (which they would call rights) while blinding itself 
as much as possible to more collective-oriented ones. To a 
large extent, doctrines of political neutrality have been put 
to rest by the communitarian critique and even by liberals' 
such as William Galston,
155
 Thomas Hurka
156
 and, above 
all, Joseph Raz. One of the most stringent reasons for so 
was precisely that evaluative arbitrariness about which John 
Finnis's words could not, once again, be more opportune: 
                                                                                                 
political neutrality fundamentals upon which such an approach relies. 
But, beyond that, Benkler also trusts that his views of the networked 
information environment are compatible with the ―difference principle‖ 
of Rawls's theory of justice – that is, with Rawls's views on 
distribution. Actually, Benkler trusts that his own views on the 
networked environment are compatible with any of the theories of 
justice he lists in his book – Rawls's, Dworkin's, Akerman's and 
Nozick's (Benkler, id. at 303-308). Is it a mere coincidence that all 
these authors have also espoused theories of liberal neutrality? (though 
the late Dworkin seems to have abandoned these, Benkler‘s reference 
seems to be still to the 1981 Dworkin). Or does Benkler‘s reliance upon 
neutralists actually tell us that it is not possible to disentangle those 
author‘s political views on autonomy and neutrality from their take on 
distribution – and that that is why perhaps Benkler is ready to refer to 
the latter? This being so, however, it would be important to point to a 
difficulty in Benkler‘s line of reasoning. Though Benkler seems ready 
to assume that Rawls's difference principle encompasses cultural goods, 
he can only do so by stretching Rawls‘s rather individualistic 
understanding of what primary goods amount to and the consequent (if 
arguable) neutrality of Rawls‘s political system towards culture. Other 
authors have explicitly tried this approach, but have also ignored the 
neutrality component of Rawls's theory, which renders the enterprise, in 
my view, equally problematic. See Jeroen van den Hoven & Emma 
Rooksby, Distributive Justice and the Value of Information: A 
(Broadly) Rawlsian Approach, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 376 (Jeroen van den Hoven and John Weckert 
eds., 2008). 
155. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, 
VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991). 
156. See, e.g., THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM (1996) and 
THOMAS HURKA, VICE, VIRTUE, AND VALUE (2003). 
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―For the sake of a 'democratic' impartiality between 
differing conceptions of human good, Rawls insists 
that, in selecting principles of justice, one must treat 
as primary goods only liberty, opportunity, wealth, 
and self-respect, and that one must not attribute 
intrinsic value to such basic forms of good as truth, 
or play, or art, or friendship. Rawls gives no 
satisfactory reason for this radical emaciation of 
human good, and no satisfactory reason is available: 
[his] 'thin theory' is arbitrary‖.157 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The main problem we have been exposed to throughout this 
article is no other but that which Finnis rightly attributes to 
Rawls – the arbitrary exclusion of important classes of 
reasons from the scope of political deliberation. 
Network neutrality does so by enjoining the state to 
make sure that no questions involving such reasons arise at 
the network layer of the Internet. But neutrality here moves, 
thus, beyond the state, beyond the typical boundaries of the 
political constitution. It precludes, for certain actors, those 
political, normative contributions of their everyday life. 
Beyond – indeed, against – what liberals of Rawlsian 
orientation would admit, network neutrality annihilates the 
autonomy of actors whose core activities lie at the network 
layer – ISPs. In Google's advocacy, only those options 
which are merely related to engineering decisions should be 
left available to ISPs, which otherwise cannot act at all. No 
significant reasons exist for so. Nor could they. Here the 
arbitrariness that Finnis speaks about is radical and the 
violation of liberal principles, conspicuous. 
Less ostensibly, the lenience with the extension of 
Google's dominance in the information environment is also 
founded upon an arbitrary decision of this sort. It reflects 
                                                 
157. Finnis, supra note 40, at 106. 
73   
 
 
 
the understanding that only competition reasons – and not, 
for instance, moral reasons – would justify state action 
against ―search engines‖. But traditional competition 
reasons, we have seen, are clearly not engaged by the new 
kind of monopolistic tendency displayed by the overall 
combination of Google's activities. Together, these 
activities tend to engender a regime of absolute 
organization that transcends the habitual considerations of 
market-based rationale. The call not to regulate Google's 
activities is thus a call to exclude other concerns – i.e. 
concerns with how  truth is presented to people, with how 
knowledge is imparted and overall with the deeper, 
substantive aspects of the information environment. We 
have just seen Benkler's cautionary notes on going beyond 
the structure. But is it true that liberalism requires us to 
keep away from substantive forms of informational 
violence that may happen deep within the information 
environment? 
Of course, structure matters. I was ready to note, in 
Part III, how important it is to measure the extent of 
Google's dominance in the information environment and 
that this requires a careful examination of the very structure 
of information flows. Elsewhere I have noted that the 
regulation of social networking sites must not (and does 
not) ignore the ways in which the structure of these sites 
constrain how our relations of friendship are carried out.
158
 
But both in Google's case and in the case of, for instance, 
Facebook, we cannot blind ourselves to the fact that 
regulating structure matters precisely because of the values 
that the structure constrains. There is no reason to assume 
that states and the law should not directly engage and 
uphold such values in enabling us to follow more 
auspicious – and, indeed, autonomous – avenues in the 
information environment. 
                                                 
158. See Marcelo Thompson, The Neutralization of Harmony, 
supra note 15. 
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Equally importantly, there are no grounds to submit 
that law should forbid any agent in the information 
environment from engaging in evaluative pursuits either. 
Nor can law do so. Rather, within and in interaction with its 
boundaries, agents – ISPs inclusively – create the values 
that render law and life overall meaningful. Doing law is 
not an exclusive privilege of governments and legislators, 
but rather an essential part of the ways of all who reason in 
practical terms. And doing law entails the adoption of 
certain criteria of validation that ―presuppose positions 
about what would be good for [a given community]‖;159 of 
certain general principles that articulate ―what seem to one, 
in one's legal thinking – as they have seemed to many 
others – to be requirements of civilized, decent, humanly 
appropriate behaviour‖.160 All of us engage with these 
principles and criteria as we live by the law in our everyday 
life. How can one not do so? 
Truth, friendship, culture, for instance, are 
important evaluative criteria that are engaged when one 
thinks of freedom, justice and the rule of law.
161
 These are 
not two completely different cognitive realms, one 
acceptable (the latter) and the other (the former) to be 
avoided at all costs by certain agents of the information 
environment. Rather, both realms compose a seamless web 
outside of which living a lawful life – or any life at all – is 
plainly impossible. While, of course, to outline the limits of 
our possible engagements with these criteria is an important 
function performed by law, the idea that one must be 
enjoined to act in partial or total disengagement from some 
                                                 
159. John Finnis, ―The Foundations of Practical Reason Revisited‖, 
supra note 40 at 110. 
160. Id. 
161. Some may disagree and defend that the identification of legal 
considerations can happen independently of moral criteria. Not even 
these, however, as noted above, would submit that successfully living a 
lawful life can happen in separation from a theory of morality that 
renders our legal pursuits meaningful and worth living by. 
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or any of those criteria makes as much sense as the pretence 
that one can be forced to act in separation from law itself. 
 
In his book ―Rights, Regulation and the Technological 
Revolution‖, Roger Brownsword speaks of a community of 
rights as the vantage point of a society which accepts that 
the ―development and application of modern technologies 
should be compatible with respect for individual rights‖.162 
Amongst more specific characteristics of such a community 
would be its embeddedness of a formal moral standpoint 
and its reflective and interpretive nature – that is, its being a 
community that ―constantly keeps under review the 
question of whether the current interpretation of its 
commitments is the best interpretation‖.163 In a way, 
Brownsword's individual rights-based community is as 
restrictive as those of other, Rawlsian-style forms of 
liberalism we discussed above. It is a community, thus, just 
in a limited sense, for its reflective and interpretive 
commitments do not seem to encompass collective-oriented 
conceptions of the good that take us beyond the language of 
individual rights. It does not provide an explicit 
justification for concern by the political system with 
substantive cultural matters afflicting life in the information 
environment. It is a community, nonetheless, for it 
recognizes our possibilities of jointly devising the 
normative commitments (at least rights-based ones) under 
which to live by in our technological society. 
We do well in expanding Brownsword's views. We 
must see to it that our substantive requirements for self-
authorship in the information environment be furthered by 
the political system with regard to options that matter 
precisely because of their common nature – for instance, 
our possibilities of forming and revising our constitutive 
attachments, our relations of friendship, through social 
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networking sites; or the priorities and degrees of relevance 
that we jointly attribute to different sources of knowledge 
and culture in the information environment. These, amongst 
others, are not projects that concern individuals as the 
exclusive bearer of claims of political morality. Rather they 
transcend individualisms and more authentically relate to 
our lives as members of a community. 
But, most importantly, as Brownsword aptly 
recognizes, we must treat all these as options that we make 
and revise as members of a community. We must appreciate 
our common membership to the overall process by which 
our individual and collective life stories unfold. There is 
nothing that speaks for neutrality or for absolute forms of 
organization here. Rather, our membership to the wider 
community of the information environment demands that 
different voices – from individuals, for sure, but also from 
groups and organizations, inclusively of economic nature – 
be equally heard. It demands that all of us are able to daily 
re-enact the substantive normative commitments by which 
we live. 
―I fear the man of a single book‖, Thomas Aquinas 
is said to have noted, in a possible reference to the dangers 
of fundamentalism. The normative evolution of the 
information environment demands indeed the teachings of 
many books. It objects to the overarching uniformity of 
standards pre-defined by any single company – as much as 
it objects to the exclusion of normative contributions by 
any other. Google's increasing and unified influence over 
the construction of meaning in the information 
environment, its belief in its own evaluative superiority, its 
mission of organizing all the world's information and its 
corresponding intent of neutralizing alternative sources of 
normative contribution speak to the heart of Aquinas's 
concerns. The boundaries between Google's different 
services tend to increasingly blur against the backdrop of its 
overall project. That Google's latest product is a social 
network called Google Plus is far from a coincidence. 
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Rather, it denotes how a complete redefinition of Google's 
core services towards a social networking platform can in 
the end be seen as no more than an incremental addition, an 
upgrade, a plus in its overall plan. And as the pages of 
Google's single book unfold, more may very well amount 
to less. 
